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Abstract 
This thesis examines and compares Swedish and Norwegian energy intensive industry firms‘ 
lobbying during the revision of the European Emissions Trading Scheme. In the applied 
framework of lobbying routes two key explanatory factors receive attention. First, the origin 
from the EU member state Sweden or non-member Norway; and secondly, the size of the 
company. Six companies are chosen as cases:  Norsk Hydro ASA, Norcem AS and Norske 
Skog from Norway; and SSAB AB, Cementa AB and Svenska Cellulosa Aktiebolaget from 
Sweden. Qualitative interviews with company representatives provide the data used to test 
hypotheses on firms‘ lobbying routes. A key finding is the extensive use of European 
associations by all firms to lobby the European Parliament, the European Commission and the 
Council of the European Union. Similarly, the use of national associations seems to be 
prevalent, pointing at benefits in better institutional response to collective lobbying and 
resource-sharing aspects. Norwegian firms, however, seem to struggle more than Swedish 
firms regarding lobbying the European Union institutions due to inferior access into the EU 
when lobbying directly, through national associations or national institutions. Not all the 
differences among the companies can be explained by originating from a EU member state 
Sweden or non-member Norway. While company size affects the number of available 
lobbying routes positively, this appears to be also dependent on cross-border production and 
possibly also on other influences. The results attempt to challenge some assumptions made in 
earlier literature and to contribute some new knowledge to a field that has not yet received 
extensive attention. 
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1 Introduction 
This thesis discusses firms‘ lobbying in the European Union and more precisely, how firms 
lobbied in the revision process of the European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS) 
that took place from November 2006 until December 2008. 
The European Union (EU) has over time developed into a large organization with a growing 
number of competencies that affect various actors from states to individuals. In this light it is 
not surprising that the amount of groups attempting to influence policy-making has increased 
over the years. Wessels (2004) has studied the interest group formation at the EU level and 
found that institutional changes in the EU have brought about more interest group activity – 
the interest groups aim to influence policy at the European level, because the power of the EU 
institutions has increased. Based on different resources, Coen and Richardson (2009: 6-7) 
estimate that approximately 15,000-20,000 interest groups operate in Brussels and about 
2,600 specialized groups own an office in Brussels. Among the interest groups registered at 
the European Parliament, about 70% are business oriented. As the authors note, these 
numbers are disputable, but it is clear that lobbying, with its distinct characteristics, is a 
significant part of the policy-making process in the EU. 
It is fairly obvious that interest groups give most attention to the policies that affect them. One 
such large policy area has been the European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading 
System (EU ETS). The EU ETS is a cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gases that has been 
first and foremost targeted towards the reduction of carbon dioxide (CO2). The aim of this 
scheme is on the one hand to fight climate change and on the other hand to support member 
states in complying with their goals set in the Kyoto protocol. Various emitting sectors are 
included in the scheme. The country-level allowances are divided between the installations in 
these sectors and the amount of allowances is reduced over time. Since the beginning, the 
scope of the scheme has been widened in terms of sectors and installations covered
1
,
 
and rules 
for allocation and other elements of the scheme have been changed. The total amount of 
emissions allowances in Europe is divided between the states, which includes 27 EU members 
and three countries that have linked their emission trading to the EU ETS. The latter are 
Liechtenstein, Iceland and Norway (European Commission 2008a).  
                                                 
1
 For complete information on sectors and installations covered in the original and the revised scheme see 
Annex I in Directive 2003/87/EC (European Commission 2003) and Annex I in Directive 2009/29/EC (European 
Commission 2009). 
2 
 
In the existing literature there has been little focus on how firms from states that are not EU 
members lobby compared to their counterparts in the EU member states. Both Norway and 
Sweden are taking part in the EU ETS. It is plausible that Norwegian companies have 
encountered more obstacles than their Swedish counterparts when participating in the policy-
making process. Some authors have previously stated that companies from non-member states 
do not enjoy the same access possibilities to EU institutions as companies from EU member 
states (Hamada 2007; Rok Pang 2004). This important question will be addressed in this 
study by focusing on lobbying by Norwegian and Swedish companies. I will attempt to 
examine if originating from an EU member state affects firms‘ choice of lobbying routes 
compared to firms that are from outside of the EU.  
Moreover, in previous literature other possible influences on firms‘ lobbying have been 
identified. For example, the size of the firm (Bennet 1999; Bernhagen & Mitchell 2009), 
policy phase (Mazey & Richardson 2006: 249-250) and EU institutions‘ different openness to 
various interests i.e. either firms, national or European associations (Bouwen 2002a, 2002b, 
2004; Eising 2007). Thus there are many possible factors that can influence how a firm 
chooses to lobby. 
To shed light on these issues, the following research questions are addressed: 
1. How did selected Swedish and Norwegian companies seek to influence the EU ETS 
revision process? Did they lobby similarly or differently? 
2. Which factors can best explain similarities and differences in the choice of lobbying 
routes? 
Lobbying in this thesis is understood as interests groups‟ and firms‟ contact and activities 
with decision-makers both on the national and supranational level with a goal to influence 
policy-making. The focus in this thesis is on firms‘ lobbying. In this study I concentrate first 
and foremost on the two following possible influences on firms‘ lobbying: originating from an 
EU member Sweden or a non-member Norway, and company size. Nonetheless, also other 
possible effects will be considered. 
A framework of lobbying routes is used for analyzing firms‘ lobbying choices when 
participating in the revision process of the EU ETS. These lobbying routes are presented 
thoroughly in chapter 3. In short, lobbying routes consist of tactics and targets. Tactics 
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include the following options when companies decide how to lobby: lobbying alone (also 
referred to as lobbying directly or individually in this thesis), in alliance with another 
company or organization, via a national association (such as the Federation of Norwegian 
Industries) or a European association (also referred to as EU association; for example, the 
European Aluminium Association). Targets include the following EU institutions that firms 
can target when they decide where to lobby the European Parliament (EP), the European 
Commission (henceforth called ―the Commission‖), and the Council of the European Union 
(―the Council‖).  
Although the EU ETS is a ―European issue‖, it is possible that firms do also lobby their 
national institutions such as ministries, politicians, state-related organizations and so on with 
the aim that these would represent their interest further at the European level. And in that 
sense the national institutions can be understood as tactics. On the other hand, it is also 
possible that the national institutions are lobbied as final targets when firms do not lobby via 
these, but lobby at these. Therefore, the national institutions are placed between tactics and 
targets and a thorough discussion for such a choice is presented in section 3.2.2.  
For example, a company can choose the following lobbying routes – lobbying at the 
Commission alone; or lobbying at the EP via a European association. All lobbying routes are 
overlapping as firms can choose to use different routes simultaneously. Such an approach 
enables constructing a more nuanced comparison of how firms lobby and take into account 
several lobbying routes at the same time.  
Fairbrass and Warleigh (2002: 3) have a strong point in their argument that the study of 
lobbying lies at the core of political science: ―One significant reason for studying interest 
representation is the academic challenge of discovering patterns of actual political 
behaviour, tracing their development, and analysing and constructing theories about them. 
From a practical perspective, there is also the desire to know about and understand how a 
political system operates, in order to participate more effectively within it‖. Thus studying 
lobbying during the revision of the EU ETS may provide better insights both into the policy-
making processes occurring at that time and into how firms participated in the revision of the 
EU ETS as well as what affected their lobbying choices.  
Different actors‘ lobbying and the effect thereof in designing both the original and the revised 
ETS has been well documented (Gullberg 2010; Markussen & Svendsen 2005; Skjærseth & 
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Wettestad 2008; Wettestad 2009; Skjærseth & Wettestad 2010) but there is a clear need for 
more thorough research and insight about how the various actors involved in the revision of 
the EU ETS choose to lobby and what affects their choices. Energy intensive industries have 
been a pivotal actor both in the preparation and implementation of the EU ETS.  
In 2000, the European Commission put forward a Green Paper on emission trading, where 
emission trading was identified as an important part of the EU‘s climate policy and a tool to 
meet Kyoto targets (European Commission 2000). The main rules for the 2005-2007 pilot 
phase and the 2008-2012 Kyoto Protocol commitment phase were adopted in 2003 with the 
Directive 2003/87/EC (European Commission 2003). Energy intensive industries and other 
interest groups were active participants in the policy-making (Skjærseth & Wettestad 2008). 
The EU ETS has been revised and extended for the third phase, that will take place from 
2013-2020. The revision began in November 2006 with the European Commission publishing 
a report on the ETS, which started wider stakeholder consultations to change the original 
Directive
2
 (European Commission 2006). The formal consultations started in 2007 and 
representatives from academia, the industry, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
member states were participated (European Commission, DG Environment 2010). After the 
consultations, the European Commission put forward the proposal for the revised directive in 
2008 to the EP and the Council (European Commission, 2008b), where a considerably altered 
system was outlined (Skjæreseth & Wettestad 2009: 116-117). After extensive discussions 
throughout the year the Directive 2009/29/EC was adopted in December 2008. The last week 
prior to final agreement was tellingly referred to as ―week of political drama‖ (ENDSEurope 
2008a). 
The companies represented in this thesis are chosen from energy intensive industry sectors 
that are included in the third phase of the scheme (European Commission 2009) and can be 
thus understood as being significantly influenced by emission trading. The companies 
included are the following: Norsk Hydro ASA (Norsk Hydro), Norcem AS (Norcem) and 
Norske Skog from Norway; and SSAB AB (SSAB) (before 2009 the name of the company 
was SSAB Svenskt Stål AB), Cementa AB (Cementa) and Svenska Cellulosa Aktiebolaget 
                                                 
2 
As with any process, pinpointing the exact start or end is more or less impossible. Here I have chosen to 
consider the Commission’s report as the start, although the Commission published two documents with results 
of a survey conducted on the functioning of the EU ETS prior to November 2006 (European Commission, DG 
Environment 2005, 2006a). The Commission had probably collected or received information and views from 
different stakeholders on any possible or desired changes to the emission system. 
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(SCA) from Sweden. The companies represent cement, paper and metal (steel and aluminium) 
production. The data collection was done by in-depth interviews. 
To answer the research questions I will first present a background to the development of the 
ETS with a short overview of relevant research together with the research questions that aim 
to fill some gaps in the existing knowledge on how the energy intensive industries lobbied in 
the revision process of the EU ETS. The theoretical approach that is used for analyzing the 
research questions is presented in chapter 3 and it discusses how to understand lobbying and 
lobbying routes. This has been developed based on the existing literature on lobbying in the 
European Union. Under the theoretical approach two main influences – originating from an 
EU member Sweden or non-member Norway as well as company size – are discussed and 
four hypotheses on how these might affect firms‘ lobbying routes are presented together with 
an examination of other possibilities. In chapter 4 follows an explanation of a chosen case 
study research framework, the use of interviewing as a main data collection method, the steps 
taken for establishing a sound analysis together with a discussion of selected companies and 
validity and reliability issues. In chapter 5 the collected data is presented by creating a 
―lobbying profile‖ for each company. These function as an empirical ground for the analysis 
that is guided by the hypotheses in chapter 6. The main conclusions and implications of this 
study are discussed in the last chapter. 
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2 Background: the development of the 
EU emission trading and the role of the 
industry 
The idea of the EU ETS is to create a cap-and-trade market. The companies that belong to 
sectors included in the scheme can emit a certain amount of CO2. One emission allowance 
corresponds to one metric ton of CO2. The companies that emit less than their allowances can 
sell the surplus on the market, while those who emit more have to purchase additional 
allowances. So far most of the allowances have been allocated for free, but from 2013 the 
main allocation mechanism will be auctioning
3
. The participants in the scheme can choose if 
it is cheaper to cut the emissions or purchase more allowances or buy Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) credits
4
 instead thereby carrying out the 
cheapest reductions first (European Commission 2008a).  
The industry affected by the planned policies has been influential in the design process of the 
EU ETS. Below a brief summary of existing knowledge on the political developments leading 
up to the establishment and revision of the EU ETS is presented. Areas that have not yet been 
scrutinized much are highlighted. 
2.1 The path leading to the adoption of the EU ETS 
Emission trading was one of the flexible mechanisms included in the Kyoto Protocol. 
Interestingly, the EU was originally against carbon trading, which was propelled by the U.S. 
as it demanded the flexible mechanisms to be included in 1997 when the Kyoto Protocol was 
designed. As it was crucial for having the U.S. on board, the EU conceded (Skjærseth & 
Wettestad 2009). Thus the emission trading became a central policy option for the EU to be 
developed: ”We have to get involved in emissions trading… we cannot let others dictate the 
rules” said the acting Environment Commissioner Ritt Bjerregaard (International 
Environment Reporter as cited in Wettestad 2001: 150). During the development of the ETS 
                                                 
3
 The auctioning is the main allocation principle, but sectors exposed to carbon leakage can receive up to 100% 
of their allocation for free (European Commission 2010). Altogether, 57% of economic (sub-)sectors are eligible 
for free allocation (ENDS Report 2009), causing of course discussions about the scheme being overly generous. 
4
 JI and CDM are two other flexible mechanisms included in the Kyoto Protocol in addition to emissions trading. 
Under the EU ETS companies can use credits from emission-saving projects carried out under the CDM and JI to 
cover some of their emissions, although there are restrictions (European Commission 2008a). 
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the industry was involved extensively. One important reason for this was that the EU lacked 
knowledge about the mechanism (Braun 2009: 477). The formal preparations to emissions 
trading can be seen starting with the ―Green Paper on greenhouse gas emissions trading 
within the European Union” that the Commission published. It identified the emission trading 
as an important part of the EU‘s climate policy. The Commission raised various questions 
about how to design the system and invited all interested parties to respond (European 
Commission 2000). The industry was involved with other stakeholders in thorough 
discussions under the European Climate Change Programme (ECCP) Working Group 1 on 
flexible mechanisms (Skjærseth & Wettestad 2008: 82). The discussions in the working 
groups were crucial for gaining support from the industry and seemingly a lot of learning took 
place informally. Important input came from large energy companies, such as British 
Petroleum (BP) and Royal Dutch Shell (Shell), as they had started an internal emission 
trading and their experience became very valuable in the development (Braun 2009: 481). 
Support from such large multinationals made it more difficult for other industries to oppose 
the idea (Skjærseth & Wettestad 2008: 75). However, the opposition to the scheme or certain 
design options existed. For example one vocal adversary was a German chemical company, 
BASF, which voiced its opinions both alone and via the German chemical industry and 
national industry associations, as well as the European Chemical Industry Council (Braun 
2009: 480). Both these formal and informal discussions were the base for the proposal of the 
directive that the European Commission put forward in October 2001 (European Commission 
2001). The proposal was in fact delayed due to intense lobbying on the Commission, as the 
industry had expected further consultations before the proposal for the directive, and the 
ECCP Working Group 1 meetings had not resulted in wide consensus on the issues of the 
design (Skjærseth & Wettestad 2008: 121). 
The proposal caused more debates, also inside and between the member states. Differences of 
opinions were for instance common in the EP and between the member states. Some of those 
issues were for instance the inclusion of the chemical industry and the adoption of a 
mandatory scheme in the pilot phase (ENDS Europe 2002a, 2002b). Especially the German 
industry was active in lobbying against the scheme. Not surprisingly, considering that the EP, 
among other things, proposed the inclusion of the chemical and aluminum sectors already in 
the pilot phase (Skjærseth & Wettestad 2008: 128). The chemical industry used clearly all 
possible ways for voicing its opinions. The Federation of German Industries and the Chemical 
Industry Association continued their protests, which included sending letters to the German 
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Chancellor, publishing ads against the scheme and ordering studies showing the negative 
impact (Skjærseth & Wettestad 2008: 108). The German industry channelled their lobbying 
also through the government. For instance, the minister of economic affairs, Wolfgang 
Clement, met with the competition commissioner in November 2002, where he expressed the 
worries of the German industry (ENDS Europe 2002c). The efforts of Germany were only 
mildly successful; most of their concerns were not taken into account (Skjærseth & Wettestad 
2008: 111). However, the chemical and aluminum sectors were not included until the 
scheme‘s later phase starting from 2013.  
After intense discussions inside and between the institutions and with different stakeholders
5
, 
the EU ETS was established in 2003 with the Directive 2003/87/EC (European Commission 
2003) and launched as planned in January 2005. 
2.2 Revising the EU ETS 
The revision of the EU ETS was planned from the start of the scheme since the first phase 
was only seen as a ―learning period‖ (European Commission 2006). However, this learning 
period had brought out some weak points in the scheme. For example, the member states had 
reported too high emissions projections, there were competitive distortions due to lack of 
level playing field, lack of harmonization in allocation and some sectors (especially power) 
had received windfall profits
6
 (Asselt 2009: 50). The over-allocation brought along a price 
crash of the emissions allowances, that started in mid-2006 and the prices fell even under one 
euro during 2007 (European Energy Exchange 2010) and this of course damaged the 
environmental aim of the scheme considerably.   
The revision of the EU ETS started with the Commission‘s report on the ETS in November 
2006, which started wider stakeholder consultations for changing the original Directive. The 
period from the Commission‘s report to the formal proposal in January 2008 can be seen as a 
policy preparation phase since the Commission was gathering information and feedback for 
                                                 
5
 For a good overview of the developments during the decision making  see Skjærseth and Wettestad (2008: 
104-138) 
6
 In phase I and phase II most of the allowances allocated to participants in the EU ETS were for free, but still 
had a price as these were bought and sold. Firms that did not have to compete with non-EU firms could choose 
to will pass on the price of an allowance to the price of the product they are selling. The profit from the pass 
through is understood as windfall, since the price of the product rose in spite of no increase in the cost to the 
participant in the scheme (WWF 2006). 
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the planned revision. Commission highlighted areas in the need of reviewing, which were to 
be discussed by the Working Group on the EU emissions trading scheme for the review of the 
Directive under ECCP II and accented the need for consulting with stakeholders (European 
Commission 2006). Under the ECCP II four meetings took place where academia, EU 
member state representatives, NGOs and industry representatives were present and discussed 
topics from the scope of the ETS to linking it with third-party countries (European 
Commission, DG Environment 2010). Energy intensive industries cooperated in their 
feedback to the Commission and formed a group ―Alliance of Energy Intensive Industries‖, 
also called the ―Key Stakeholders Alliance for ETS Review‖ (the Alliance), and published 
two position papers (Alliance of Energy Intensive Industries, CEFIC & IFIEC 2007; Key 
Stakeholders Alliance for ETS Review 2007). However, several of the industry organizations 
that were members of the Alliance also provided their own position papers as did NGOs, 
some state institutions and research organizations. It seems that the industry had an effect on 
the decision-makers, as towards the end of the 2007 the Industry Commissioner (who was 
also one of the Commission‘s Vice-Presidents), Günter Verheugen, told that the needs of 
energy intensive industries‘ must be taken into account to avoid carbon leakage7 
(International Environment Reporter 2007). In spite of this, the industries were apparently not 
relieved, as in the final days before the Commission was supposed to put forward the formal 
proposal, the European Roundtable of Industrialists published an open letter to Günter 
Verheugen where  issues such as the negative impact of possible auctioning and indirect 
effect on industries‘ competitive position were highlighted (European Roundtable of 
Industrialists 2008). 
The Commission put forward the proposal for the revised directive to EP and the Council in 
January 2008 (see European Commission 2008b). The period from the proposal until the 
adoption of the directive in December 2008 can be seen as decision making phase. The 
scheme was proposed to become both stricter and more centralized compared to the first two 
phases and several stakeholders opposed certain ideas in the proposal. Energy intensive 
industries were describing carbon leakage as a credible threat due to proposed auctioning of 
allowances, while for example WWF presented counter-arguments to cement industries 
                                                 
7
 Carbon leakage means that emissions in countries not covered by the EU ETS rise due to the implementation 
of EU ETS (Asselt 2009: 12). It can happen since some sectors included in the EU ETS are in risk of facing higher 
costs of production which could result in losing out in the international competition and the strategy for such 
firms can be relocation of the production to countries that are not covered by the EU ETS. 
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concerns of being exposed to carbon leakage (van Renssen 2008). Also aluminum producers 
were strongly advocating against being included in the trading scheme (Pearce 2008). EU 
member states did have different views and several of these (especially Germany) took active 
positions that were beneficial to their industries. Member states‘ views contributed to the final 
design of the revised directive (Skjærseth & Wettestad 2010: 109-110). 
Discussions were also present in the EP. For example there were disagreements among the 
Members of the European Parliament (MEP), among other things, on whether forestry should 
be included in the scheme, and how the auction revenues and sectors exposed to carbon 
leakage should be treated (ENDSEurope 2008b, 2008c, 2008d). Nevertheless, the agreement 
was achieved in December and the new Directive 2009/29 set the main rules for the period 
2013-2020. The lobbying activities from the industry thus seem to have paid off as the final 
directive was less strict than the Commission‘s proposal and some of the changes made 
during the decision making process were in the interest of energy intensive industries. For 
instance, instead of auctioning 100 per cent of the allowances by 2020, as proposed in the 
Commission‘s proposal, a minimum 70 per cent of allowances are to be auctioned in the non-
power sector. Clear criteria was set for defining the sectors in significant risk of carbon 
leakage and these could receive up to 100 per cent of allowances free (ENDSEurope 2008a).  
2.3  Short overview of the literature on the EU ETS 
There is a growing amount of literature on the EU emissions trading system that focuses on 
different aspects of this policy. Here I will focus on some main previous research on the EU 
ETS and the role of industry lobbying which are relevant for this thesis. A comprehensive 
overview of studies and evaluations of the EU ETS is presented in a study under the 
Adaptation and Mitigation Strategies: Supporting European Climate Policy (Asselt 2009: 32-
49), where a large amount of literature is divided and commented on, with the following 
topics: scope and coverage, cap-setting, allocation, competitiveness and leakage, access to 
CDM and JI credits, compliance and enforcement, and cross-cutting issues. The study itself 
focuses on the functioning of and the lessons to draw from the EU ETS pilot phase and the 
beginning of the second phase, how these have been taken into account in the revised 
directive as well as drafting some possible challenges for the future (Asselt 2009). 
Several scholars have been studying the making of the EU ETS and discussed stakeholders‘ 
positions and role in the policy-making. Christiansen and Wettestad (2003) discuss the path 
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leading to the proposal of the initial directive in 2001 and among other things the need to take 
member states‘ and the industries‘ positions into account in designing the scheme. Skjærseth 
and Wettestad (2008) analysed in their book why, how, and with what results the EU ETS 
was developed. In the book views from different stakeholders, such as industries, member 
states and environmental organizations, and their role in the process of the policy making 
process are discussed extensively. Braun (2009) examined the development of the EU ETS 
and how different interests in policy networks that were established by the Directorate-
General (DG) Environment contributed significantly to the policy-making process. Markussen 
and Svendsen (2005) studied the effect of lobbying by comparing the outcome for the main 
stakeholders from the Green Paper to the final Directive 2003/87/EC and attempted labeling 
the main stakeholders winners or losers. Although the clear difference was difficult to 
establish, the authors concluded that the electricity producers managed to influence the final 
directive most and that was due to their bigger size and cooperation with each other. Similarly 
Gullberg (2008a) examined the positions of electricity producers and consumers in the review 
of EU ETS and studied how much these were reflected in the Commission‘s proposal for the 
revised directive. She concluded that the energy intensive industries were more successful 
than power producers in getting their views taken into account. Wettestad (2009) continued 
the perspective of looking at the winners and losers in the policy-making processes and 
studied why the energy intensive industries fared better in the revised Directive 2009/29/EC 
compared to the proposal. One reason found for that was that the energy intensive industries 
became more organized and active in the policy-making process compared to the designing of 
the original ETS directive.  Skjærseth and Wettestad (2010) discussed the development and 
the revision of the EU ETS and how different actors (from the EU Commission to industry 
organizations and member states) were engaged in the policy-making. Skodvin, Gullberg and 
Aakre (2010) on the other hand examined how and under what conditions the target-group of 
a policy can influence policy feasibility and used the revision of the EU ETS as an example. 
They conclude that although the DG Environment had a role of an agenda setter, its agenda-
setting function was limited by the industry‘s power, which the industry had in the member 
states. 
2.4 Indicating some knowledge gaps 
The industry‘s influence in the making of the EU ETS is clearly established in the examples 
brought forward both in the discussion on the making of the EU ETS and the literature 
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review. However, in the literature on the EU ETS focus has been on industries in certain 
states, especially in Germany, and on the large EU associations, such as the Alliance, and 
sectoral associations and not on individual firms. Which is not surprising as there is little 
information available on how individual firms have participated in the revision process.  
It is also clear, that the industry was cooperating in different formations – lobbying through 
associations, their national politicians and targeting different EU institutions as noted in the 
section 2.1 and 2.2. But how exactly the industry firms designed their lobbying has not been 
studied. There is vast literature on firms‘ lobbying and influences on firms‘ choices, while 
most of the literature focuses on how companies or interest groups from EU member states 
lobby, as explained in Chapter 3. There is no agreement on whether firms from outside of the 
EU have more difficulties when attempting to lobby the EU institutions. Hamada (2007) and 
Rok Pang (2004) for example write that both Japanese and South Korean firms do experience 
more difficulties when lobbying in the EU than their European counterparts. On the other 
hand Bernhagen and Mitchell (2009), who studied firms‘ direct lobbying, suggest that non-
EU firms with commercial interests in the EU lobby more directly than firms from the EU and 
explain this with the fact that firms from non-EU countries do not have a ―state patron‖ in the 
EU institutions. If it is so, then the non-EU firms should not struggle too much when lobbying 
the EU institutions. However, if and what kind of differences there can be between the 
companies due to their membership status, and how prevalent such differences are compared 
to other possible influences on firm lobbying, is unclear.  
This is why the following aforementioned research questions are addressed in this study: 
1. How did selected Swedish and Norwegian companies seek to influence the EU ETS revision 
process? Did they lobby similarly or differently? 
2. Which factors can best explain similarities and differences in the choice of lobbying 
routes? 
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3 The theoretical approach: the route to 
lobbying routes 
3.1 Explaining lobbying 
Lobbying is often seen as an activity from different interests that affects planned or existing 
policy and lobbying can thus be described as either successful or not. For example Christine 
Mahoney (2007a) has taken such an approach. Some researchers study which means of 
lobbying can be considered more effective than others (Coen 1997, 2009; Bouwen 2002a, 
2002b, 2004) or identify constraints on the influence the lobbying actors can achieve 
(Michalowitz 2007). Other researchers take a broader view, emphasizing that lobbying also 
includes the acquisition of information about how the system works and the establishing of an 
interest representing actor as a participant. Such view was supported by Andersen and 
Eliassen (1991: 173) since they claimed that the EU lobby system was yet to develop. Fifteen 
years later lobbying is according to Mazey and Richardson (2006: 249) as much about 
minimizing surprise by being informed as it is the attempt to influence a policy. That is by no 
means a surprising claim as the EU has grown over the years both by the number of members, 
policy areas and decision-making power and thus it is challenging for interests to decide how 
and whom to lobby.  
Some researchers differentiate between institutionalized and non-institutional lobbying. The 
former is by Gullberg (2008b: 2965) understood as participating in formal hearing processes 
and meetings, while the latter constitutes informal meetings with politicians and authorities, 
conferences and media campaigns. Lobbying could be studied by only focusing on 
institutionalized lobbying, for example the participation in formal working groups, 
stakeholder meetings, hearings, etc. However, if one studies institutionalized lobbying only, it 
is difficult to grasp the choice made by the interest groups in choosing whom to lobby (ibid: 
2967). When firms and interests groups participate in institutionalized lobbying, the initiative 
comes usually from the EU institutions (for example, invitation for participating in a working 
group, such as the ones under the ECCP and ECCP II during the making and revision of the 
EU ETS) and focusing only on this might not cover all the lobbying activities the firms 
engage in. 
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In this study lobbying is defined so that both institutional and non-institutional lobbying are 
taken into account while focusing on actions that are aimed to influence a policy: “Lobbying 
is interests groups‟ and firms‟ contact and activities with decision-makers both on the 
national and supranational level with a goal to influence policy-making”. For parsimony the 
actors examined here are energy intensive industry firms (see chapter 4 for a thorough 
discussion on the choice of cases).  
3.2 Lobbying routes 
In the research on lobbying in the EU various distinctive terms are used that all mark the 
actors‘ decisions when taking on lobbying activities, here I refer to some of these. The list is 
by no means complete but gives an insight to the terms used frequently.  One common term in 
the lobbying literature is strategy. Mahoney (2007a: 40) uses the term outside lobbying 
strategy to mark activities aimed at influencing public opinion. It is used synonymously with 
outside lobbying tactic (ibid: 43, 53) and outside lobbying techniques (ibid: 51). The 
synonymous terms tactic, strategy and technique all mark one different choice that firms can 
take when lobbying– hiring a consultant, lobbying in a coalition or using outside lobbying 
(ibid: 41).  
Some researchers use the term strategy to mark a collection of different lobbying choices that 
the firms take. For example Taminiau and Wilts (2006: 123) operate with the term corporate 
political strategy, that seems to be synonymous with lobbying strategy (ibid: 122) and it 
consists of three decisions. First, if to relate to the government on a short-term or long-term 
basis; secondly, taking collective or individual action; and lastly, choosing a type of strategy 
to interact with authorities. Therefore in their terminology, lobbying strategy can be both a 
collection of certain lobbying choices while it is also used to mark one type of strategy as they 
differentiate between providing information, financial incentive and constituency-building 
strategy (ibid: 123).  
Differently to the previous examples, for describing a collection of lobbying choices some 
researchers prefer the term lobbying behavior. The term lobbying behavior is used by 
Bernhagen and Mitchell (2009: 156) and it marks firms‘ lobbying actions in general. It seems 
to consist of lobbying decisions, which in their turn seem to characterize the different actions 
by the firms; under focus in their article is the decision to lobby the EU institutions directly as 
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they study several possible influences on that. Lobbying behavior is used synonymously with 
political behavior (ibid:156-157).  
Anne Therese Gullberg (2008c) operates too with the terms lobbying behavior and lobbying 
strategy. The lobbying behavior in her article appears to be consisting of lobbying strategies 
(ibid: 167) but how exactly these two last terms relate to each other, is unclear. The concept 
lobbying strategy is used to mark specific lobbying action, either lobbying on single policy 
issues or on the whole policy field (ibid: 167). The term is used similarly to characterize a 
particular lobbying activity in another article of hers, where lobbying strategy denotes 
lobbying either decision-makers with similar or opposing opinions (2008a: 2964, 2966). 
3.2.1 Lobbying routes – taking account of the ”Where?” and 
”How?” in lobbying 
The myriad of meanings assigned to commonly used terms in the literature on lobbying 
highlights the need to define the terms used in the research distinctly. In this thesis I prefer to 
operate with the key term lobbying route for describing how and where the firms lobbied in 
the revision process of the EU ETS. Below reasoning for such a choice is presented. 
One of the most thorough explanation of firms‘ lobbying choices is from David Coen 
(1997:20-24), who lists the following options as lobbying channels and studies the intensity of 
using these among firms: national associations, national civil service (ministries), local 
members of parliament, national government, regions, European associations, UNICE – 
Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe (now BUSINESSEUROPE), 
European Commission, European Parliament, members of the European Parliament and hired 
lobbyists. On the one hand, this list gives a good overview of different choices a firm might 
have when deciding how and where to lobby. On the other hand, I consider the list to be too 
long for qualitative study (Coen used this for quantitative study). It could be argued that some 
of these so called lobbying channels are better understood as institutions the firms target when 
lobbying, for example the EU institutions with decision-making power to which firms try to 
get access to when using channels like associations. 
Pieter Bouwen (2002a: 373; 2002b: 10) has taken the previous idea into account. He presents 
a more parsimonious approach as he depicts firm‘s lobbying choices in a matrix, where a firm 
on the one hand has to decide if to lobby on the national or European level, and on the other 
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hand, if to engage in individual action, collective action or hire a third party to do the 
lobbying. He studies and theorizes about which type of access goods lobbying alone, via 
national or EU association and third parties can provide to the different institutions. An access 
good is seen as a type of information that is exchanged for the access to the policy-making 
(2002a: 378-383; 2002b: 7-8). The institutions included in his articles are European 
Commission, European Parliament and the Council. Therefore it can be claimed that Bouwen 
takes into account both the ―How?‖ and ―Where?‖ in lobbying, since he focuses both on the 
means of lobbying (when he discusses firms‘ possibilities for engaging in individual 
lobbying, using associations or hiring a lobbyists) and on the institutions the firms target 
when lobbying (the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council). Such 
an approach is not very frequent in the literature on the lobbying in the EU, although a similar 
approach has been used by Marie Hojnacki and David C. Kimball (1999). In their work the 
authors analyze lobbying in the United States (U.S.) and study the targets, i.e. whom the 
interest groups lobby; and tactics, i.e. how the interest groups lobby. 
Based on the previously mentioned three articles I have come to the conclusion that when 
studying private firms‘ lobbying it is important to take into account different institutions and 
organizations as David Coen has done, but at the same time differentiate between the ―How?‖ 
and ―Where?‖ as it was carried out in the other two referred articles. Therefore I prefer to 
operate with a dependent variable called lobbying route, in which both these questions are 
taken into account. I have chosen to call the institutions included under the ―Where?‖ question 
as targets and the choices under ―How?‖ as tactics, similar to Hojnacki‘s and Kimball‘s 
(1999) use of the terms in the U.S. context.  
The use of the term lobbying route in this thesis is most certainly diverging from other 
authors‘ viewpoints. For example Bennett (1999) differentiates between direct, national 
association and European route, as he differentiates between using national and European 
associations and lobbying directly. And thus the route only marks the tactics, as the 
institutions lobbied are seen as one. 
The idea of comparing lobbying routes has been previously used by taking account of 
different channels. M.P.C.M van Schendelen (1993: 11) depicted different lobby routes that 
firms can use when lobbying the EU and these included lobbying alone or via different 
collective actions. Inspired by Schendelen Pijnenburg (1998) added to his scheme some more 
possible and used routes by companies. Nevertheless, the mentioned authors studied the 
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European institutions as one target without differentiating between the EU institutions and 
thus focusing only on possible tactics. Tenbücken (2002) demarcated the EU institutions 
when he studied how large multinational car producers used different influence channels 
when lobbying the EU. He studied only large multinational companies in one sector very 
extensively for mapping the extent of used routes, while in this thesis I aim to compare firms 
from different sectors.  
3.2.2 The EU institutions as lobbying targets 
Much of the academic literature on lobbying in the EU focuses mainly on lobbying at three 
EU institutions – the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Council of the 
European Union, which I consider the targets of lobbying. It is erroneous to consider these 
institutions as having a compact architecture because the EU works at different levels and 
configurations. Although it would be academically quite novel to disaggregate the institutions 
and study lobbying in the EU on a more specified level, such an attempt would overstretch the 
aims of this study
8
. Even though for instance Pieter Bouwen emphasizes that the 
commonplace committees in the European Commission influence significantly the lobbying 
patterns of interest groups (2009: 23), which suggests that the use of committees and working 
groups in policy-making has an influence on firms lobbying. Below I explain based on the 
existing literature why I have decided to include each of the EU institutions as targets. 
The European Commission 
The Commission has been previously pointed out as a significant venue for interest groups to 
lobby since the Commission is the initiator of the legislation in the first pillar
9
 and thus often 
the first contact point for the interest groups (Michalowitz 2002: 44-45). Lobbying early in the 
policy phase is useful not only because it probably gives better results than lobbying later, but 
it is also important for different interest groups to minimize surprises (Mazey and Richardson 
                                                 
8
 Coen (1997; 1999) has analyzed the allocation of lobbying resources not only to the European Parliament, but 
also to the members of the European Parliament and to the committees of the European Parliament. Similarly, 
Eising (2007) studied the contacts between firms, national associations and European associations on the one 
hand and leadership and working level of the EU institutions on the other hand. This approach in Coen’s and 
Eising’s quantitative research is not common in the literature as most researchers consider the EU institutions 
as unitary actors, especially in qualitative studies. 
9 
The EU’s first pillar is called also the Community pillar as it includes the three Communities: the European 
Community, the European Atomic Energy Community  and the former European Coal and Steel Community 
(Phinnemore 2007: 32).  
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2006:249). Bouwen notes that is commonly accepted that when lobbying prior to the 
Commission providing any formal documents, the changes are easier to achieve for interest 
groups (2009:25).  
The Commission has been shown to be open to interests in empirical research. For firms or 
national and EU level associations it is not difficult to acquire information from the 
Commission and lobbying activities are most often conducted when the policy proposals from 
the Commission are being designed (Eising 2007). However, it is by no means just a one-way 
interest by lobbying actors. The Commission is in need of external knowledge when 
developing policies. Consulting different interest groups provides both knowledge and 
support and legitimacy for the planned policies (Mazey & Richardson 2006: 249, Bouwen 
2009: 22-23).  
The European Parliament 
The EP has seen an increase in lobbying due to an increase in its legislative powers (Mazey & 
Richardson 2006:260; Michalowitz 2002: 46). While the powers of the European Parliament 
were gradually increasing before, the biggest change in legislative powers came in 1993 with 
the Maastricht Treaty when the co-decision procedure was first introduced to certain policy 
areas. That meant that in these areas the EP and the Council shared the legislative power and 
the Parliament could veto legislative proposals. The co-decision was further extended in the 
European Parliament‘s favour in 1999 with the Amsterdam Treaty and 2003 with the Nice 
Treaty (Scully 2007: 177-179). The EP has been attracting a significant amount of lobbying 
from different interest groups. As the Commission, the EP needs to interact with interests 
groups to gain information and legitimacy, and the two organizations can be seen as 
competing for legitimacy (Lehmann 2009: 50).  
It is likely that the European Parliament attracts a certain type of interests, especially those 
that have less access to the Commission (Mazey & Richardson 2006: 260). For example, the 
European Parliament is regarded as the ―greenest‖ among the interest groups (Lenshaw 2005: 
315; Pedler 2002: 114) and that might explain why business organizations lobby the European 
Parliament less than Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) and why they prefer to work 
with the European Commission (Gullberg 2008b: 2967). In spite of this, according to a study 
conducted by Eising (2007), the access to European Parliament for business interests seems to 
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be easy and there are extensive contacts between the European Parliament and firms, national 
and EU associations.  
The Council of the European Union 
The Council is first and foremost an intergovernmental body that congregates the 
representatives from the member states. The Council is meeting in various configurations, 
when different ministers from member states meet. The Council has traditionally been seen as 
a closed body and this has not changed much (Hayes-Renshaw 2009: 70-73). The difficulty of 
access is not only because of the tradition of secrecy in the decision-making, but also because 
it is very fragmented and thus gaining the information on what exactly is being discussed by 
whom can be too exhaustive to some interest groups. In addition, the personnel of the Council 
is often fluctuating (Hayes-Renshaw 2009: 74). However, as the other two institutions, it 
needs to get essential information for decision-making from somewhere. Mazey and 
Richardson (2006: 263) identify three main access points to the Council – national delegations 
in Brussels who are part of the COREPER, members of working groups and national 
governments. These options were clearly drafted with focus on interests from member states. 
Whether and to what degree companies from non-member states use such options for 
lobbying EU member states, or if interest groups and firms also lobby other member states in 
the Council, has to my knowledge not been studied. However, it is at least theoretically 
possible. The permanent representatives are expected to be open to different opinions, as their 
duty is to report the views of other member states and EU institutions to their national 
governments in their home countries (Hayes-Renshaw 2009: 85). According to the study 
conducted by Eising (2007) it seems that both firms and national and European associations 
do interact with the Council, although the intensity and frequency is lower compared to when 
interacting with the Parliament or the Commission.  
Based on the discussion above, all these institutions will be included among the targets of the 
lobbying routes, regardless of the fact that the three institutions work on different levels as 
policies are prepared in committees, working groups and so on. In this thesis the institutions 
will not be disaggregated. For discussing how these institutions can be lobbied, I will now 
turn to lobbying tactics. 
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3.2.3 Choosing lobbying tactics 
Firms can choose between different tactics when conducting their lobbying efforts. Direct or 
individual lobbying has been described as most preferential for firms (Coen 1997: 19-21; 
2007: 339; 2009: 156). This is a sound claim – when a single firm is lobbying directly it can 
present its own position according to its preferences and thus no compromises have to be 
made. Bouwen (2002a, 2002b) notes that (especially large) firms are useful for policy-makers, 
because they have expertise and technological know-how that the EU institutions need. 
Therefore lobbying alone is included under tactics. 
Although it can be claimed that lobbying directly is most useful, firms have to adopt multiple 
tactics as a risk avoidance strategy (Mazey & Richardson 2006: 255).  Studies have shown 
that, firms use different associations in addition to accessing the EU institutions directly 
(Bennett 1999; Bernhagen & Mitchell 2009; Coen 1997; Coen 1998; Eising 2007). Firms 
have the possibility to join both national and EU associations. On the one hand, EU 
associations have been claimed to be rather slow and sluggish, because the decision-making 
inside these organizations has to include different member‘s positions (Mazey & Richardson 
2006: 255) and the national associations can be assumed to suffer from the same problems as 
these have to aggregate a multitude of interests. On the other hand, previous research has 
shown that both EU and national associations are used for lobbying the EU. Using these 
associations provides access to the institutions included in this thesis under targets (Eising 
2007, Bouwen 2002b). There are different possible reasons for firms to lobby via 
associations. According to Bouwen (2002a; 2002b; 2004) associations are used because these 
provide access to the European Union institutions since these combine different interests and 
can supply knowledge about wider interests, either European or national. This can be needed 
by the European Union institutions to make decisions that satisfy a wider sphere of interests 
and not for example just one single company. Therefore lobbying via national and EU 
associations are the next two tactics included in this study. 
Collective representation can also take a form of lobbying in ad-hoc alliance with another 
firm or company. The main goal with lobbying in alliance is to create credibility in the eyes of 
decision-makers (Coen 1999: 30). Gullberg (2008b: 2969) states that unexpected alliances 
between firms or other interest groups that usually have differing positions can more easily 
win a majority in the European Parliament. Such ad-hoc alliances that do not take a long term 
or institutionalized form, have been used for example by software firms and environmental 
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organizations in EU lobbying (Coen 1998: 81-82; Pijnenburg 1998) Ad-hoc alliances are less 
common in the EU than in the U.S., lobbying for a variety of possible reasons (see Mahoney 
2007b), but it is definitely relevant also to understand the lobbying patterns in the European 
Union. Lobbying in alliances has not been studied to my knowledge comparatively with other 
possible tactics. Including lobbying in alliance among the tactics might be able to provide 
information on how common it is and why firms choose or don‘t choose to lobby in alliances. 
National government and institutions – neither targets nor tactics 
All firms can lobby their own government. If they do so, there are two options. First, they can 
lobby their own government and other national institutions with the aim that these represent 
their interests further to the EU institutions. This is easier for firms from member states, but 
even though Norway is not a member of the EU, politicians, ministers and members of 
national institutions do frequently communicate with colleagues from other countries. 
Secondly, the firms might lobby the national government and institutions with an aim that it 
would take their views into account on the national level.  
Therefore the national level should not be included as one of the targets, as sometimes the 
national level can be used to gain access to the European institutions and studying it as one of 
the targets could obscure some lobbying patterns. It cannot be included as a separate tactic 
either since sometimes national government and institutions can be lobbied as final targets. 
Including national level under tactics could thus overestimate the national level‘s importance 
as a route to the European institutions if the firms lobby the national level as a final target. 
The national institutions are placed between the tactics and targets in the system of lobbying 
routes. This allows me to grasp that firms might lobby the national level as a final target, but 
also use it as a tactic in lobbying aimed at the European Union institutions. 
Lobbying routes in brief 
Conclusively, when firms lobby they can choose a tactic to use to lobby at the different targets 
and in addition decide how to relate to the national authorities and institutions. It must be of 
course noted that inside the associations the decision which EU institution to target is most 
certainly taken together. In that sense the firms do probably not have a free choice when 
deciding where to lobby via associations. Possible influences on firms‘ used lobbying routes 
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are discussed in the next section. The lobbying routes are depicted in a more compact manner 
in figure 3. 
Figure 3. Example of a lobbying profile of a company with three used lobbying routes. 
 
This figure corresponds to a company that uses three lobbying routes. First, lobbying alone at 
the national institutions; secondly, via national institutions at the European Commission; and 
thirdly, lobbying via national associations at the European Parliament. From each of the 
tactics, the arrows can theoretically go to all of the EU institutions and at the national 
institutions. There are thus theoretically nineteen possible routes to be used. It should be noted 
that the routes could be counted differently – lobbying alone via national institutions at the 
Commission could be understood as one route. This approach was not favoured since in a 
situation where a firm lobbies at the national institution via different tactics and the lobbying 
is further aimed to the EU institutions, when the national institutions are approached 
sometimes as a final target the national institutions would be counted as a tactic each time. 
This would result in over-estimating national institutions role in lobbying routes. 
Using such an approach enables comparatively studying which tactics are used to lobby 
certain targets. Additionally it gives a possibility to study the lobbying patterns in the area of 
EU ETS more thoroughly. Previous studies have demonstrated that the energy intensive 
industries were influential in the policy-making (see section 2.3). In this thesis the focus is not 
only on which routes energy intensive industries used in the revision of EU ETS, but also on 
the reasons that influenced the choice of lobbying routes. In the following section I will 
present and discuss various influences on firms lobbying routes. 
Alone 
 
In alliance 
Alone 
In alliance 
Via a national association 
The European Parliament 
The European Commission 
The Council of the European 
Union Via a European association 
National institutions 
TACTICS TARGETS 
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3.3 What can explain the differences in firms’ 
lobbying routes? 
In this chapter I will present different previously suggested or tested arguments about the 
influences on firms‘ choices on the lobbying. There is no single theory that would explain 
how and where firms lobby in the European Union. However, there is now a rich body of 
literature that aims to theorize about or test firms‘ lobbying behavior. Below I draw upon the 
existing literature and the controversies among scholars, and establish hypotheses about the 
firms‘ lobbying routes. Two main possible influences are discussed below. First, originating 
from Sweden, a EU member state, or from Norway, a non-member. Secondly, company size 
will receive attention. These are used as grounds for explaining two possible differences in 
firms lobbying routes. First, the use of tactics for lobbying at certain targets and secondly, the 
number of lobbying routes firms are able to use. In addition, some other possible influences 
are considered. These influences should not be seen as mutually exclusive, but possibly 
complementary.  
3.3.1 Insiders’ and outsiders’ different possibilities – Swedish and 
Norwegian companies 
The differences in firms‘ and other interest organizations‘ lobbying patterns due to national 
characteristics have been discussed before in the literature. For example in an anthology by 
M.P.C.M van Schendelen (1993) various authors discuss lobbying traditions in different 
states. Coen (1998) analyzed Italian, German, British and French large multi-national firms‘ 
from lobby activities and how these were influenced by and adapted to their national political 
systems. Eising (2007) examined, among other things, differences between German, French 
and British national association‘s contacts with the European institutions and the timing of 
lobbying activities and concluded that the national associations are very similar, despite 
significant differences in their national interest representation patterns. 
Whether a firm‘s lobbying capability is shaped by being based in an EU or a non-EU member 
country is a question that has as of yet received very little attention. It is possible that 
Norwegian firms experience some difficulties when lobbying at the EU level because they are 
unable to use certain tactics to the same degree or the same way as their Swedish counterparts 
can. Some lobbying tactics seem to be more useful than others for lobbying at certain EU 
institutions. On the one hand, Eising (2007) found that firms have most direct contact with the 
24 
 
European Commission, less with the European Parliament, and least with the Council
10
. He 
also found that firms, the EU associations and national associations differ in how often they 
have contact with the various EU institutions and how active these are in different policy-
phases. On the other hand, Pieter Bouwen (2002b) studied the demand side of lobbying by 
examining which interests the Commission, EP and the Council prefer to consult in the 
policy-making. He concludes that the firms‘ have a higher degree of access to the Council 
than to the Commission and least to the EP and the institutions differ on which type of 
interests (firms, national associations and EU associations) they prefer to listen to. 
Nevertheless, he also points out that the Council and the Commission are interested in 
communicating with different types of firms as the Council access is limited to what Bouwen 
calls ―national champions‖ e.g. large firms that operate mostly nationally. Although these 
studies point to different directions when it comes to which tactics provide most access to 
different institutions
11
, it appears that some tactics are either used more frequently for 
lobbying at certain EU institutions or are preferred by various EU institutions. If Norwegian 
firms experienced problems in using one or more of the tactics considered in this study, it is 
thus probable that it resulted in less access to all or to some of the EU institutions compared to 
their Swedish counterparts. For example, it is reasonable to assume that lobbying via 
Norwegian national associations is more difficult than via Swedish ones since the Norwegian 
associations might be seen as ―outsiders‖. There are thus grounds for assuming that 
Norwegian and Swedish firms used different lobbying routes during the revision of the EU 
ETS. However, there is to my knowledge little research on this matter and therefore the first 
hypothesis is formulated in a quite general manner: 
Hypothesis 1: Swedish and Norwegian firms differed in lobbying routes due to originating 
from a EU member state or non-member state. 
While there is little research that could be used for general assumptions about how Swedish 
and Norwegian firms might differ in the use of lobbying routes, some researchers have 
studied how not originating from an EU member state influences firms‘ use of direct 
lobbying. Bernhagen and Mitchell (2009) studied large companies‘12 direct lobbying. They 
                                                 
10 
Although Eising looked at both the top and preparatory levels by studying contact with European Commission 
leadership and working levels, MEPs and EP committees and Council of Ministers and COREPER, combining the 
results did not change the ranking.  
11
 That does not mean, that one of them was wrong, as Eising focused on the supply of lobbying from interests, 
while Bouwen on demand by the institutions. 
12 
They drew a sample of Forbes Global 2000, which lists the 2000 largest firms in the world (Forbes 2005).  
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found that among the top ten countries with the highest absolute number of companies 
lobbying directly
13
, there were three non-EU countries – the U.S., Japan and Switzerland. 
Among the top ten countries based on the percentage of firms that lobby directly in the EU 
there were two non-EU countries – Norway and Switzerland (ibid: 166-167). They explain 
this with the fact that firms from non-EU countries do not have a ―state patron‖ in the EU 
institutions and therefore are not as easily able to lobby at these (ibid: 161, 168). Nonetheless, 
their study has one controversy that could also point to an opposite conclusion, even though 
they do not interpret it in that manner: in their quantitative study they find that EU 
membership has a positive effect on firms lobbying directly, but they explain it with the fact 
that non-EU members are less commercially active in the EU and thus do not find it relevant 
to lobby in the EU (ibid: 170). However, rather than the lack of commercial interest, this may 
indicate a lack of established lobbying routes, especially the possibility of using direct 
lobbying. 
Yukihiko Hamada (2007) has studied Japanese firms‘ lobbying and adjustment in their 
lobbying behavior towards the European Union. He has uncovered several peculiar findings. 
First, among the car producers and electronics firms direct lobbying has been rare. Sony in 
particular was very much capable of individual lobbying, while Toyota and Honda have tried, 
rather unsuccessfully, to become independent actors and to not be seen just as Japanese firms. 
Most firms had to rely on Japanese collective channels. This finding stands clearly in contrast 
to Bernhagen and Mitchell‘s suggestion, that when companies from outside the EU have 
commercial interests in the EU, they lobby alone.  
Hamada (2007) also noted that Japanese firms from both sectors experienced difficulties in 
using European associations – Toyota‘s application for membership in the European 
Automobile Manufacturers' Association (ACEA) was rejected several times (ibid: 411). Also 
electronic firms were treated as outsiders in their representative European associations (ibid: 
412). It is possible that also Norwegian energy intensive firms were outsiders in the EU 
associations and therefore rather lobbied alone during the revision of the EU ETS. 
Conversely, Andersen and Eliassen (1993: 274) noted (although a while ago) that it is difficult 
for individual Norwegian companies to establish themselves as serious actors inside the 
Commission and lobbying via EU associations would provide better access. These 
contributions give grounds to different assumptions and highlight the need to study if 
                                                 
13 
Measured by having a Brussels office, a European Affairs representative and an EP lobbyist. 
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Norwegian firms lobbied alone more or less than their Swedish counterparts. Therefore the 
following sub-hypothesis to supplement the first will be used to study this matter more 
profoundly: 
Hypothesis 1.1: Norwegian firms used more direct lobbying at the EU level than their 
Swedish counterparts due to their outsider status in the European associations and the lack of 
a ―member state patron‖ in the EU institutions. 
3.3.2 If you want to be heard, size matters 
EU membership is most certainly not the only issue that influences how firms‘ lobby. One 
specific variable has received some attention in the literature on lobbying: the size of a 
company.  
Eising (2007) compared large firms‘ lobbying patterns to associations‘ and concluded that 
firms have much more contacts with different EU institutions compared to national and 
European associations. In addition, the firms rated the possibilities of acquiring information 
from the institutions better than the associations did, although the differences were not large. 
Coen and Dannreuther (2003) claim that not all firms have resources for being active in 
lobbying at the European level as small and medium sized firms (SMEs) have encountered 
troubles in participating in the policy-making process. Coen (2009: 164) also noted that firms 
have to consider to which political channels they distribute their funds as there are always 
budget constraints. These findings suggest that larger firms are capable of using different 
lobbying routes more as they are in frequent contact with the EU institutions and have more 
funds available for administrating different lobbying routes. 
Hypothesis 2: Larger firms use more different routes than smaller firms. 
Whether direct lobbying is influenced by the firm‘s size has been a topic for some studies. 
Robert J. Bennett (1999) studied influences on firms‘ choices to lobby directly and found that 
the larger the firms, the more direct lobbying they undertake. However, that applied only to 
the companies with at least 200 employees, suggesting that there is a threshold of resources 
that can be used for direct lobbying (ibid: 254). Similarly, one of the main results of 
Bernhagen and Mitchell‘s (2009) study was that large firms undertake more direct lobbying. 
This was explained by the ability to allocate better resources to lobbying but also because 
larger firms are more attractive to policy-makers. Coen (2007:339) also emphasizes the 
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resources when stating that larger firms can acquire insider status in the Commission due to 
their size and cross-border production. Relying on these contributions here, it is plausible to 
assume that larger firms use direct lobbying more often than smaller firms. The sub-
hypothesis to hypothesis two thus becomes: 
Hypothesis 2.1: Larger firms engage in more direct lobbying at the EU level than 
smaller firms. 
3.3.3 Other influences  
In the literature on lobbying other influences on firms lobbying choices have been identified. 
Due to the limits of this thesis it is not possible to test all of these with hypotheses. However, 
it is necessary to point out also some other variables with explanation power and consider 
these at least briefly during the collection and analysis of the data to make sure this study does 
not overlook any influences on firms‘ lobbying routes. To be sure, the scope of the existing 
research on EU lobbying is much wider and includes both theoretical and empirical studies 
that identify various other influences on firm lobbying not considered here. 
Policy phase 
Several authors have noted the importance of lobbying early in the policy-making process as 
early lobbying actions can set the agenda and prioritization. Early involvement can result in 
bigger pay-offs, because the main original ideas incorporated in the Commission‘s proposal 
rarely are significantly altered by the time the final directive is adopted (Héritier et al. 1996; 
Peterson 1995, as cited in Taminiau & Wilts 2006: 126). Lobbying early, before the decision-
makers have taken a position on the issue, allows thus not only to gain information on 
decision-makers‘ and other actors‘ positions, but also to define the issues from the very 
beginning (Gullberg 2008b: 2968-2969).  
Especially the Commission‘s agenda-setting role and therefore its importance in the policy-
preparation phase as a lobbying target has been emphasized (Mazey & Richardson 2006: 
149). The EU institutions are competing for legitimacy with other EU institutions (Lehman 
2009: 50) and thus the Commission needs to demonstrate that it has included a wide array of 
stakeholders in the preparatory processes.  
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Therefore it is possible that firms‘ lobbying was influenced by the policy phases and firms 
lobbied the Commission more during the policy-initiation than during the decision-making 
phase.  
Number of members and degree of conflict in the EU associations 
Several researchers have discussed characteristics of the European associations and how these 
influence firms‘ lobbying. Sometimes European associations have been described as being 
ineffective tactics for lobbying. For example Mazey and Richardson (1995: 347) characterize 
the European associations as follows: ”It is now conventional wisdom that most European-
level groups are under-resourced, inexpert, slow to react, and, above all, so seriously 
factionalized that they can articulate only what have come to be regarded as lowest common 
denominator to EC policymakers”. This they regard to be mostly due to differing viewpoints 
of members from (at that time) fifteen different states (ibid: 347) and because the decision-
making inside these associations seems to be ineffective and under-resourced (Mazey & 
Richardson 2006: 255). As the possible problems seem to arise from the multitude of 
opinionsdue to high number of membership, it is reasonable to assume that when the number 
of members in associations is high, the firms prefer to use other tactics. In contrast to Mazey 
and Richardson, Bennett (1999) found that when associations are small, companies tend to 
lobby more directly, especially when the members are large companies. The level of conflict 
in European associations is related to Pijnenburg‘s (1998) argument that companies lobby in 
alliances (ad-hoc coalitions in his terms) when there are internal divisions in the European 
associations. 
In this study differences in lobbying routes due to policy-phase, number of members in the 
EU associations and conflict in these are considered as primary alternative explanations in 
addition to originating from Sweden or Norway, and company size. There are also of course 
many other possible influences on how firms‘ lobby. For example Pijnenburg (1998: 315) 
further theorizes that alliances are used in lobbying when in the policy development (or in his 
case rather in policy-dispute) there is an involvement of large and particularly pan-European 
companies, when core business interests are at stake, when there is a small number of 
coalition partners in (at least one of) the opposing camps, or a short life cycle of the product. 
This demonstrates that firms‘ use of lobbying routes can at least theoretically be affected by a 
variety of possible factors and other influences might have to be considered during the study.  
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4 Methodology 
4.1  Case study as a suitable format 
The following two research questions are addressed in this study: 
1. How did selected Swedish and Norwegian companies seek to influence the EU ETS 
revision process? Did they lobby similarly or differently? 
2. Which factors can best explain similarities and differences in the choice of lobbying 
routes? 
Case study research is chosen as a suitable format for studying the abovementioned research 
questions. Gerring (2007: 20) defines the case study as a thorough study of a single case 
where the purpose is to illuminate a larger population of cases. A study consisting of few 
cases is understood as a case study and a study with many cases a cross-case study (2007: 20). 
In this study six companies from energy intensive industries are chosen as cases. Although the 
border between few and many can be difficult to define, I consider this study as a case study 
with few cases, where the cases all represent a defined population – energy intensive industry 
firms in Sweden and Norway affected by emission trading. Additionally, the firms represent 
three different sectors – pulp and paper, metal, and cement production.  
Although the research questions could be also studied on a wider scale and include for 
example the entire European Union by means of sending out surveys, a case study with just 
some companies was preferred due to several reasons. First, the constraints of time and 
language would have made a large-scale study difficult. Second, surveys have been used in 
lobbying research previously, but have resulted in poor response rates. One study for example 
resulted in only 41 percent response rate (Eising 2007). The likelihood of a low response rate 
would have made the study of different influences on lobbying behavior difficult because of 
the probable lack of enough companies for each independent variable, and also because of a 
possible sampling bias.  
In the literature on lobbying the European Union institutions‘ various effects on firms‘ 
lobbying behavior have been identified. These are often conflicting, different influences are 
rarely studied together and there is very little literature that would study how companies from 
non-EU member states lobby, as pointed out in the previous chapter. Therefore a deeper 
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insight is needed and the case study‘s strength is that it enables to better examine details and 
causal mechanisms in a complex system than studies with many cases (George & Bennett 
2004: 21-22; Gerring 2007: 49). The research questions are aimed at finding and explaining 
differences in firms‘ lobbying routes. The case study is more suitable than a large cross-case 
study for such purposes (George & Bennet 2004: 25). For studying what influences the firms‘ 
choice of lobbying routes I use the hypotheses presented in the previous chapter. In the light 
of Gerring‘s (2007:42) statement that theory testing is not the strong side of case studies 
hypotheses in this study are used as a guidance for organizing and taking into account 
possible explanations rather than testing a theory with a high degree of confidence. However, 
using hypotheses allows analyzing whether some of the previously identified influences are 
relevant in explaining the lobbying routes of the selected companies. 
The case study has several pitfalls. One of these is that due to common selection bias and non-
representative samples, conclusions in case studies can not easily be generalized to wider 
populations (George & Bennet 2004: 22-25; 30-32). Nonetheless, researchers conducting case 
studies often do not have the aim of applying the conclusions for a wide population of cases; 
instead the results should be applied only to certain sub-class of cases (ibid: 32). For 
overcoming the problems of representativeness George and Bennet (ibid: 69) identify the 
following crucial steps in selecting the cases: First, the universe to which the cases belong has 
to be identified. Secondly, the research objective and strategy must lead the selection. Thirdly, 
the cases should possess variables considered to explain the outcome(s). My choice of the 
companies is guided by the abovementioned criteria. 
Choosing the cases  
The firms in this thesis represent selected sectors from energy intensive industries in Sweden 
and Norway. Although there are many companies likely to be affected by the EU ETS one 
way or another, the study is limited to the energy intensive industries due to the following 
reasons. First, it is reasonable to assume that a firm decides to spend resources on attempts to 
influence the policy only when the issue is of high importance. Therefore the companies from 
sectors included to the EU ETS should be under study. Since the start of the EU ETS the 
number of sectors and installations included under the scheme has been increased. In the 
original Directive 2003/87/EC (European Commission 2003) the following sectors were 
included: energy activities, production and process of ferrous metals, mineral industry 
(production of cement, glass and ceramics), pulp and paper. The revised Directive 
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2009/29/EC (European Commission 2009) covers a larger amount of activities as new sectors, 
for example aluminum production and non-ferrous metal refining, were added.
14
  
Power producers and the industries included are affected by the EU ETS in quite different 
ways. Power producers are usually capable of passing on the cost of the allowances, while the 
same does not apply to the energy intensive industries as the latter are more exposed to global 
competition (European Commission, DG Environment 2006b). Therefore there has been a 
wide discussion of ―windfall profits‖ to the power producers as they receive CO2 allowances 
for free in the first and second phase of the EU ETS
15
 (Wettestad 2009). The power sector is 
probably also more diverse than the energy intensive industries when it comes to the ways it 
is influenced by the EU ETS.
16
 Since it is likely that the heterogeneity of interests affects the 
lobbying behavior, the power producers were excluded from the population of cases to be 
analyzed. The alternative would have been to include several additional cases.  
To study if and how the lobbying behavior between companies from EU member states and 
non-member states differs, the companies from Sweden and Norway are studied as Sweden is 
a member of the EU and Norway is not. This choice was also a pragmatic decision guided by 
two main factors. First, as the thesis is written in Norway, Norway and Sweden were easily 
accessible countries both in terms of language, time and financial resources. Secondly, this 
study is part of a research project at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute – Climate Change Altering 
Nordic Energy Systems (CANES), which focuses on Norwegian and Swedish companies.  
The companies were chosen from the sectors considered to be especially affected 
economically by the EU ETS and also considered to be exposed to ―carbon leakage‖17. Some 
companies and sectors lobbied hard to be included among the sectors at risk for carbon 
leakage. For example, in December 2008 a massive protest of metalworkers took place in 
Brussels because steel production was not at the time considered as in high risk of carbon 
                                                 
14 
For the precise list of installations included see Annex I in the directives (European Commission 2003, 2009). 
15
Christian Egenhofer (2007) gives a good discussion and explanation of the economic effects of the EU ETS on 
both the power and energy-intensive industry. 
16
 E.g. burning fossil fuels, such as coal, results in high CO2 emissions. The producers would have cover the 
extensive emissions by CO2 allowances or cut back production. Power producers are capable of passing on the 
costs of purchasing the CO2 allowances and thus the electricity prices rise. However, the increase in electricity 
prices is preferable to renewable electricity producers as these are less CO2 intensive and profit from the higher 
prices without having to purchase CO2 allowances (Svein S. Andersen 2009 [personal conversation]). 
17 
For more information on which sectors are considered exposed to carbon leakage and the criteria used to 
define it, see the Commission’s information page about the carbon leakage (European Commission (2010a)  
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leakage (Phillips 2008). When the chemical industry was claimed to be unaffected by carbon 
leakage by the Climate Strategies research group, the European Chemical Industry Council 
(CEFIC) instantly expressed its disagreement (ENDS 2008e). Choosing companies from these 
sectors would probably give more information on lobbying, as it is probable the firms took on 
lobbying activities because the issue of the ETS was of high importance for these sectors.  
The sectors included in this thesis are the following: pulp and paper, cement and metal 
production of steel and aluminum. Prior to conducting the research it was not possible to be 
sure how the companies have lobbied, because such activities are rarely documented or taking 
place in public. Therefore most-similar or most-different case selection techniques, which are 
very common in qualitative literature and are based on matching both the independent and 
dependent variables (George & Bennet 2004:50; Gerring 2007:89-90, 131-144) were not 
used. If I had had knowledge on firms‘ lobbying routes, these case selection methods would 
have been most natural to consider for the purpose of identifying what influences firms‘ 
lobbying routes. As I did not know beforehand which lobbying routes firms used, and that 
became also one aim of the thesis, I applied a technique called diverse case-selection by John 
Gerring (2007:89, 97-100). This means that the cases are chosen to represent a full range of 
variation on either independent or dependent variables, or on both. The chosen companies 
vary on the independent variables – originate from Norway and Sweden, vary in size18 and 
additionally in the EU associations‘ number of members. In addition, they belong to different 
sectors so that the cases would represent a wider part of the energy intensive industries in 
Norway and Sweden. It is reasonable to expect that the influences on firms‘ decisions on how 
and where to lobby identified in the previous studies have some effect and thus the companies 
should also be different on the dependent variable – lobbying routes. Selecting cases to 
represent a full range variation also enhances the representativeness of the chosen sample, 
even though it does not have necessarily the same distribution of variable values as the 
population has (ibid: 100). 
  
                                                 
18
 To measure company size, yearly revenue is used (see also section 4.4. discussing the operationalization). 
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4.2 Selected sectors and companies 
4.2.1 Cement production 
Cement production is a sector where the EU ETS has a strong direct effect. The increase in 
the cost of production was evaluated to be more than a third (compared to a ―no ETS‖ 
scenario) due to direct emissions, assuming a CO2 price of 20 Euro per ton, and no free 
allowances (European Commission, DG Environment 2006b). In another study cement was 
considered to be one of the most affected industries by the EU ETS cost impact on production 
value (Lund 2007). The European Cement Association (CEMBUREAU) published a position 
paper during the revision of the EU ETS, where they highlighted the negative effect of the EU 
ETS on the competitiveness of the European cement industry and expressed their preference 
for a global system and saw the EU ETS only acceptable as an in-between system and that 
only if several significant measures were undertaken (CEMBUREAU 2007a). It is therefore 
highly probable that cement companies did engage in lobbying during the revision of the EU 
ETS.  
Norcem – cement producer in Norway 
Norcem is the only cement producer in Norway. It is a subsidiary of HeidelbergCement 
Group (HeidelbergCement), a large multinational cement and concrete producer. Although it 
is related to HeidelbergCement, it is still a separate company with headquarters in Oslo and 
two production plants in Norway. Although it can be anticipated that being a subsidiary to 
HeidelbergCement at least somewhat influences the choice of lobbying routes, using Norcem 
as a case was necessary to cover a sector significantly influenced by the emission trading. As 
it is very usual that firms are subsidiaries or daughter companies to some larger companies, I 
did not find any other companies that could be compared to Swedish counterparts. In 2007 
Norcem reported a total revenue of 1.4 billion NOK (Norcem not dated: 4). Norcem is a 
member of the Federation of Norwegian Industries (Norsk Industri in Norwegian) in Norway 
and CEMBUREAU in Europe. CEMBUREAU has in total 28 members. The members as a 
rule are national associations, but when there is no cement association, a company is a 
member. But in such case the company represents still the cement sector in a country, as it is 
the case for both Norway and Sweden (interviews 2010). 
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Cementa – cement producer in Sweden 
Cementa is the only cement producer in Sweden and also a subsidiary to HeidelbergCement. 
In 2007, Cementa had revenues of 1.8 billion SEK (Cementa AB not dated: 4), which at time 
was about 1.56 billion NOK
19
. The issue that lobbying routes can be influenced by belonging 
to HeidelbergCement Group is relevant here as well. Leaving out Cementa would have meant 
leaving out the whole cement sector, as both Cementa and Norcem are the only cement 
producers in Sweden and Norway. Before the interview started, I had information that 
Cementa is a member of the Swedish building material industry association (Byggmaterial 
Industrierna in Swedish) and to Swedish Aggregates Producers Association (Sveriges 
Bergmaterialindustri) as a supplier. Both these organizations are part of the Confederation of 
Swedish Enterprise – (Svenskt Näringsliv). During the interview at Cementa, I was informed 
that on the issue of EU ETS Cementa has been active in other associations than the 
aforementioned; namely in Plastics & Chemicals Federation (Plast- & Kemiföretagen); in 
SveMin, which is the mining, mineral and metal producers association (interview 2010). As 
Cementa is the only cement producer in Sweden, the company represents the entire national 
cement industry in CEMBUREAU as Norcem does for Norway.  
4.2.2 Metal production: aluminum and steel 
Primary aluminum production is a sector that was included in the scheme from 2013. It has 
been evaluated that it has already been considerably affected by the ETS, because of the 
indirect effect on power prices while not being able to pass the cost increase on to the 
customers due to high competition. In a study conducted by the DG Environment, the cost 
increase due to EU ETS was evaluated to be around 11.4 percent assuming a CO2 price of 20 
Euro per ton and the increase was exclusively due to indirect effect of the EU ETS (European 
Commission, DG Environment 2006b). A high indirect effect on the cost of production was 
also found in another study (Lund 2007). During the revision process of the EU ETS, the 
European Aluminum Association (EAA) published a position paper where they emphasized 
the reductions in emissions that aluminum industry already had achieved and that including 
aluminum into the emission trading scheme would not contribute towards meeting the EU‘s 
Kyoto commitments, while adding significant costs to the aluminum production. As a 
consequence, it strongly opposed the inclusion into the scheme (EAA 2005). 
                                                 
19
 In this thesis I use the Oanda historical exchange rate converter (Oanda 2010). I used the yearly averages 
both for Swedish and Norwegian currencies. 
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Primary steel production seems to have been significantly influenced by the emission trading 
due to high direct effects of the EU ETS. The primary steel production was evaluated to be 
facing a total cost increase of 17.3% with a CO2 price of 20 Euros per ton, without any free 
allocation. Due to the competition from outside of Europe only a small amount of the cost 
increase was assumed possible to pass on to customers (European Commission, DG 
Environment 2006b). In a study, Peter Lund (2007) also considered steel as one of the most-
affected sectors. Not surprisingly, the European Confederation of Iron and Steel Industries 
(EUROFER) published a presentation of their positions on the emission trading during the 
revision process. In this presentation they criticized the ETS system as a threat to 
competitiveness and suggested a different design for the emission trading system (EUROFER, 
not dated).  
Norsk Hydro – aluminum producer in Norway 
Norsk Hydro is a large aluminum producer with operations in many countries. In 2007 the 
revenue was about 94 billion NOK (Norsk Hydro not dated: 1). In Norway, Hydro belongs to 
the Federation of Norwegian Industries. At the European level Norsk Hydro is a member of 
the European Association of Metals (Eurometaux), which represents non-ferrous metal 
industry, and the European Aluminum Association (EAA). In total Eurometaux has 57 
including associations, individual companies and associated members (Eurometaux 2010). 
EAA has in total 41 members:  companies, European and national  association and associated 
members (EAA 2010). 
SSAB Steel – steel producer in Sweden 
SSAB is a large steel company in Sweden, with subsidiaries or offices in 40 countries. The 
revenue in 2007 was 47.7 billion SEK, which at that time was about 42 billion NOK. SSAB is 
a member of the Swedish Steel Producers' Association (Jernkontoret in Swedish) in Sweden 
and thereby also a member of the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise. It also belongs to 
EUROFER. EUROFER has company, national association and associated members – total 69 
members (EUROFER 2010). 
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4.2.3 Pulp- and paper production 
In studies conducted in the beginning of the revision process of the EU ETS, the pulp and 
paper sector was reported to consider the impact of EU ETS a key issue on long-term 
decisions, while the total cost increase for pulp and paper was expected at between 1 and 
7.5% percent with a CO2 price of 20 Euros per ton, without any free allocation (European 
Commission, DG Environment 2006b). This is less than for other sectors. Among selected 
sectors in risk of exposure to carbon leakage, pulp and paper was found to be the least 
affected (Lund 2007). The Confederation of European Pulp and Paper Industries did not 
contribute any position papers on its own but instead in cooperation with several other 
European industry associations under the Alliance (Alliance of Energy Intensive Industries, 
CEFIC & IFIEC 2007; Key Stakeholders Alliance for ETS Review 2007). 
Norske Skog – paper producer in Norway 
Norske Skog is a paper company that produces newspaper and magazine paper and has 14 
paper mills around the world. The revenue in 2007 was 27 billion NOK (Norske Skog not 
dated: 2). Norske Skog is a member of the Federation of Norwegian Industries in Norway and 
thereby also a member of the Confederation of European Paper Industries (CEPI), which has 
19 members, all of them national associations (CEPI 2010).  
Svenska Cellulosa Aktiebolaget (SCA) – Swedish paper producer 
SCA is a large paper and paper products company that operates in more than 90 countries. 
The revenue in 2007 was almost 107 billion SEK, which at that time was about 92 billion 
NOK. SCA belongs to the Swedish Forest Industries Federation (Skogsindustrierna in 
Swedish) and thereby of the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise. As Norske Skog, it is a 
member of CEPI. 
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Table 4. Overview of companies and possible explanatory variables 
Company Sector Country 
Revenue in 2007 
in billion NOK 
EU association and 
number of members 
Cementa Cement Sweden  1.56  
CEMBUREAU - 28 
members 
Norcem Cement Norway 1.4  
CEMBUREAU - 28 
members 
SSAB 
Metal production - 
steel Sweden 42 
EUROFER - 69 
members 
Norsk 
Hydro 
Metal production - 
aluminum Norway 94  
Eurometaux - 57 
members 
EAA - 41 members 
SCA Paper Sweden 92  CEPI - 19 members 
Norske 
Skog Paper Norway 27  CEPI - 19 members 
 
4.3 Collecting the data – qualitative research and 
interviews 
The main data collection method was the qualitative interview. The interview data was 
supplemented with information from the companies‘ and European associations‘ documents, 
such as annual and environmental reports and articles from various media sources. The main 
reason for using qualitative interviews was that there is no available data that could be used 
for understanding how and where the companies lobbied – such information is not published 
for example in company reports or other public documents. Secondly, the issue is quite 
complex and the employees working with emission trading and lobbying have the most 
information on the matter. Thus the natural solution became to interview them to ensure rich 
information. In each of the companies there was only one or very few people working with 
the EU ETS and other environmental issues. Each company referred one person as most 
knowledgeable on the topic. 
Seven people were interviewed; six were representing companies and one the Federation of 
Norwegian Industries, as during the interviewing process it became clear that the issues under 
discussion were quite different in Norway and Sweden. This was due to the fact that at the 
time of reviewing the EU ETS in Norway, there had been a discussion of linking Norway to 
the ETS and that was a very important issue for the companies (this is explained further in 
section 6.1.1). Because lobbying in Norway was often conducted via the Federation of 
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Norwegian Industries, I had an interview at that organization to increase my understanding of 
the processes in Norway.  
The interview type could be labelled as ―key informant interviews‖ according to Svein S. 
Andersen (2006). The interviewees were those who had the knowledge on how the company 
participated in the policy making during the revision of the EU ETS, and their own subjective 
experiences were used for understanding firms‘ lobbying routes (ibid: 282). The interviewees 
had high positions in the companies and were working with the issues of the EU ETS daily 
(see table A.1 for the list) and were in fact very knowledgeable. First a request for interviews 
was sent out to people who according to company websites or information gained from the 
first interview
20
 were working with the issues of the EU ETS and lobbying. If the person 
addressed was not correct, another person was recommended by the company.  
Semi-structured interviews with mostly open-ended questions were used (see appendix A for 
interview guides). In the semi-structured interview the interviewer has an interview guide 
with quite specific questions and topics to be covered during the interview, while the 
questions do not have to be answered exactly in the same order (Bryman 2004: 321). The 
interviews took more a form of a conversation while I sometimes took pauses to check which 
questions in my interview guides had not been answered. Since the interviewees had received 
a short overview of the questions, the interview took a conversational form since they were 
familiar with the main focus of the interview. 
During all the interviews I used a voice recorder and asked permission to do so both in the 
introductory e-mail and in the beginning of each interview. All the interviewees agreed. The 
digitally recorded interviews were not uploaded electronically and in interview transcripts I 
used codes instead of person and company names due to privacy protection requirements 
(NSD 2010). This was also explained to the interviewees. Using the recorder was useful 
because it allowed me to focus more on the interview and follow the conversation and ask 
follow-up questions and probes instead of only writing up answers. However, during each 
interview I also made quite extensive notes. Several times my notes and the actual recording 
seemed to be in conflict, therefore sometimes the recording helped me to correct my 
understanding that I otherwise had based on my notes. I do not think that the interviewees 
                                                 
20
 The first interview turned out to be more like a pilot interview, since it provided quite extensive knowledge 
on the developments in Norway, as well as suggestions for the study and whom to contact for further 
interviews. 
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omitted anything because of the recorder. I had explained how I would use these and agreed 
that they will have a possibility to review all parts where I refer to them in person or the 
companies, together with anonymizing the interviewees as much as possible.  
The initial interviews were followed up by a second interview in Norway, and via phone and 
e-mail in Sweden. Based on the information from the interviews some changes were applied 
to the interview guide. First, the company representative at the first interview suggested being 
careful with the term ―lobbying‖ as it often has a negative connotation in everyday life, which 
could cause resistance among the interviewees. Therefore during the contacting process and 
often during the interviews I used terms ―interest representation‖ or ―participation in policy-
making‖.21 However, in the beginning of each interview I explained that in my thesis I use the 
term lobbying and that lobbying in political science is seen as a natural part of any political 
process. Looking back, it was necessary to explain how I understand lobbying and what the 
aim of the study is, to reduce possible resistance. As I understood that it might be a sensitive 
topic, I decided to anonymize the interviews as much as possible and the interviewees were 
informed about that. Another adjustment that I made during the interviewing process was 
changing my interview guide. The original matrix scheme that I had planned to use for 
mapping how the companies lobbied proved to be too complex as it had too many different 
options to choose from. Instead, I collected the data by questions and drew lobbying route 
schemes with the help from interviewees.  
At each interview I agreed with the interviewee to take again contact if something was left 
unclear and that they would be able to review the company presentations that are presented in 
chapter 5. It must be noted that all the interviewees were very open to such follow-ups and 
they often went very thoroughly through the presentation of their companies. One 
representative (from Cementa) did not have the possibility to do that. Therefore it is possible 
that the information on Cementa is less correct than the others. None of the interviewees 
asked to leave out any information, or deleted any information. 
  
                                                 
21
 Anne Therese Gullberg, who is a researcher at the Center for International Climate and Environmental 
Research in Oslo (CICERO), recommended the use of these terms. She has among other things, done research 
on lobbying. 
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4.4 Making the study valid and reliable 
For securing a high degree of validity and reliability, this study draws upon the guidelines of 
Michael Gibbert, Winfried Ruigrok and Barbara Wicki (2008). They divided the discussion of 
validity and reliability into internal, construct and external validity; and reliability. Under 
each category several techniques were presented based on several previous authors.  
 ‗―Internal validity”/…/ refers to the causal relationships between variables and results. Here 
the issue is whether the researcher provides a plausible causal argument, logical reasoning 
that is compelling enough to defend the research conclusions‘ (Gibbert, Ruigrok & Wicki 
2008: 1466). For securing a high degree of internal validity, one measure recommended was 
to demonstrate with the research framework that the identified variable brings on the change 
on the dependent variable and not a third, omitted variable (ibid: 1466-1467). To ensure this, 
various possible influences on lobbying were discerned from the literature and included as 
independent variables to exclude spurious relationships, as explained in chapter 3. This is very 
similar to another of their recommendations, theory triangulation (ibid: 1466-1467). I tried to 
take into account a wide body of literature (often with conflicting views) when developing the 
possible influences on firms‘ choice of lobbying routes. There are, to my knowledge, no 
established theoretical schools on EU lobbying that could be compared. Additionally, during 
the study some other possible influences were found as will be explained in chapter 6. 
Since the internal validity is about providing sound causal arguments, a form of pattern 
matching was carried out when gathering and analyzing the data to detect any relationships 
that were not considered before the data collection. Pattern-matching compares empirical 
findings with predicted patterns and possibly also alternative patterns (Yin 2003: 116-118). It 
took firstly the form of asking interviewees about used and not used tactics and targets, why 
these were preferred or not preferred and thus attempted finding the causal explanation for 
used and not used lobbying routes. It also allowed the interviewees to express their 
experiences without it being guided by the theoretical expectations in the thesis. Secondly, the 
established lobbying routes and reasoning for using these were compared with the hypotheses 
and the literature. Thirdly, as some findings were not matching the expectations, alternative 
explanations were given.  
‗The “construct validity” of a procedure refers to the quality of the conceptualization or 
operationalization of the relevant concept./…/ As such [it] refers to the extent to which the 
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study investigates what it claims to investigate, that is, to the extent to which a procedure 
leads to an accurate observation of reality.‘ (Gibbert, Ruigrok & Wicki 2008: 1466). The 
quality of the concepts is ensured by thorough explanation of the used concepts as lobbying 
routes and lobbying as presented in chapter 3. Operationalization of the possible influences on 
lobbying pattern is discussed below.    
The operationalization of companies‘ origin (either Swedish or Norwegian) was decided 
according to the physical situation of the company and its headquarters as well as the 
registration of the companies in Norway in the Brønnøysund Register Centre and in the 
Swedish Companies Registration Office in Sweden. It must be noted that several of the 
companies also have production and offices in other countries – a result that is unavoidable 
when studying companies whose revenue can be measured in billions. As mentioned before, 
Norcem and Cementa AB both are subsidiaries to HeidelbergCement Group, and thus their 
Swedish or Norwegian origin could be questioned. Nevertheless, as these firms are in charge 
of production in Sweden and Norway, belong to their own national associations and 
separately to CEMBUREAU, I found it tenable to count Norcem as a Norwegian company 
and Cementa AB as Swedish.  
The size of the company is measured in sales e.g. revenue. This has been used before in the 
literature on lobbying. E.g. Bernhagen and Mitchell (2009) used sales to measure firm size 
and did so with confidence as alternative measures, such as assets, market value or a 
composite measure including all three, did not affect the results of their study (ibid: 164). 
Revenue was therefore considered a suitable proxy for measuring sales. Since the preparations 
to the Commission‘s proposals mostly took place in 2007 (they started in November 2006), I 
considered the revenue of 2007 to be suitable for measuring size during the revision process. 
It is also useful to know that these companies‘ revenue did not fluctuate enough in 2006-2008 
to change how the companies are ranked based on their sales.  
I operationalized the policy phases as follows: the policy-initiation phase took place from 
November 2006 until January 2008. In 2006 the Commission published a report on the EU 
ETS and highlighted the areas needed for reviewing and invited stakeholders to participate in 
the review process (European Commission 2006). In January 2008 the Commission put 
forward the formal proposal for the revised directive to the European Parliament and the 
Council (European Commission 2008b). The policy development phase took place from 
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January 2008 from the proposal for the revised directive until December when the final 
Directive 2009/29 (European Commission 2009) was adopted. 
The number of members in the European associations was derived from the association 
websites. I decided to treat associations, firms and associated members equally. It could of 
course be argued that a national association or associated member is less of a ―coherent 
member‖ than a firm, but I consider that there are more threats to validity in assigning a 
different weight to other members compared to firms. The number of members in the EU 
association is used as an additional measure of conflict, as it was anticipated that the 
interviewees might prefer not providing information about possible conflicts. 
Gibbert, Ruigrok, Wicki (2008: 1467) identified also techniques that could enhance the 
construct validity. I have tried to take into account several of these: review of drafts by 
interviewees, indication of data collection circumstances and explanation of data analysis. The 
aim of these is to present a ―clear chain of evidence‖ (ibid: 1468) by thorough explanation of 
how I collected and used the data. First, the drafts on company profiles as presented in chapter 
5 were reviewed by the interviewees to ensure that I had understood everything correctly but 
also to confirm that the firms did not have any objections. It must be noted that the 
representative of Cementa had not had the possibility to review the draft on Cementa‘s 
lobbying profile, and thus it might be less correct than others.  Secondly, I have outlined the 
data collection circumstances above by explaining the interviewing process. Third, the 
explanation of data analysis is explained further below. One measure specifically 
recommended for ensuring high construct validity – data triangulation (ibid: 1468), e.g. 
collecting data from different sources, was not used. The characteristics of lobbying are a 
hindrance – lobbying activities are rarely documented and often do not take place in public. 
Other sources (in addition to interviews) to check which lobbying routes the firms used where 
simply not available. Other sources as articles from media, company and association reports 
and position papers were mainly used as background or explanatory sources.  
It is possible that due to interviewing process there are some issues that threaten the construct 
validity in this thesis. As the review of the EU ETS is a complex process that took place a 
while ago, it is possible that the interviewees did not remember everything correctly. There 
are limits to what one can remember and memory is also influenced by psychological 
processes such as rationalizing (Andersen 2006: 292-294). During the interviewing process it 
became clear that interviewees could not differentiate between policy-phases. In addition to 
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perceiving the review of the EU ETS as a continuous process, the interviewees told that they 
couldn‘t remember exactly when any of the EU institutions was lobbied more than others 
(interviews 2010).  
Another possibility is that interviewees provided incomplete information. For example, none 
of the interviewees mentioned any conflict inside the EU or national associations (interviews 
2010). It is of course highly possible that there were no significant disagreements. On the 
other hand it is also possible that the interviewees omitted such information because it could 
damage relationships inside the association. However, it is the interviewees‘ right to decide 
what information to provide. It is voluntary to participate in any kind of research, not least for 
master theses, and it is clear that any research should always take into account the informant‘s 
interests.  
―External validity” or “generalizability” is grounded in the intuitive belief that the theories 
must be shown to account for phenomena not only in the setting in which these were studied, 
but also on other settings‖ (Gibbert, Ruigrok & Wicki 2008: 1468). The issues of external 
validity were to an extent already treated when discussing the choice of companies. Three 
different recommended measures were undertaken during the research. First, several cases 
were studied – six different companies. Secondly, the selection of the cases is explained 
thoroughly and thirdly, I also presented each of the firms (Gibbert, Ruigrok & Wicki 2008: 
1467-1468). However, I do not aim to generalize the results to all firms from energy intensive 
industries. The selected cases represent only those from Sweden and Norway.  
―Reliability‖ refers to the absence of random error, enabling the subsequent researchers to 
arrive at the same insights. The keywords are transparency and replication (Gibbert, Ruigrok 
& Wicki 2008: 1468). To ensure reliability in this study I have tried to explain how I 
proceeded in this chapter, although I have not developed a formal case study protocol or 
database as recommended by the authors (ibid: 1468). However, I have added the interview 
guides as well as the list of interviewees in appendix A. 
4.5 Presenting and analyzing the data 
The material I gained from the interviews was organized according to the research questions 
and the theory outlined in chapter 3. Based on the interview data I then developed a profile of 
each company depicting lobbying routes used. For clarity, companies‘ lobbying routes were 
44 
 
depicted in schemes. In these schemes there is a differentiation between ―more 
important/more used‖ and ―less important/less used‖ lobbying routes. However, where the 
line goes for each of the interviewee is not possible to define. I had tried to establish a 
comparative measuring system to gauge the intensity and importance of the use of lobbying 
routes in my original interview guide. It was quickly proven to be too complex for the 
interviewees to rank all the tactics and targets or to provide a weight for the choices. 
Nevertheless, the interviews provided information on which of the tactics or targets the 
individual companies used more than others. I decided to depict the differences in the 
importance of the lobbying routes to keep that layer of information, although these are not 
easily comparable between the companies.  
The mapped lobbying routes of firms studied in this thesis were then analyzed according to 
my research questions and hypotheses. As mentioned above, the analysis was guided by 
pattern-matching principles, which involved comparing the collected data with hypotheses 
and literature used to develop these. When the findings did not match with the expectations, 
but rather with other possible patterns, alternative possible explanations were brought 
forward. 
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5 The actual use of lobbying routes – 
company profiles and comparison 
5.1 Norsk Hydro – to the EU alone and together 
The aluminum sector in this study is represented by Norsk Hydro, a Norwegian company. In 
2007 Norsk Hydro had a total revenue of 94.316 billion NOK (Norsk Hydro, not dated: 1) and 
in 2007 it had four primary aluminum smelters in Norway, one in Germany, two in  
partnership with another company – one in Slovakia and in Norway (Norsk Hydro, not dated: 
31-32). Norsk Hydro is a member in the EAA and Eurometaux and in the Federation of 
Norwegian Industries. Norsk Hydro is as of yet first and foremost indirectly affected by the 
EU ETS through rising power prices. From 2013 aluminum production will be included in the 
EU ETS and the scheme will most probably become more costly for Hydro. Therefore Hydro 
aims to be a leader in both reducing emissions and being a leading participant in designing the 
system (interview 2010). 
Although the company representative emphasized that for effective participation in the policy-
making processes, one has to use all possibilities (interview 2010), Norsk Hydro has used two 
tactics most – lobbying directly and lobbying via European associations – using the EAA and 
Eurometaux. Lobbying directly took place both at the European level, at the national level in 
Norway, in Slovakia and especially in Germany. When Hydro lobbied directly in Norway, it 
was only slightly with the aim that the Norwegian authorities would represent their interests 
further at the EU level. Therefore the direct lobbying in Norway as a rule was conducted so 
that the national institutions were the final target. Lobbying alone at the European level was 
organized through Norsk Hydro‘s Brussels office, where two employees were working with 
the EU ETS in addition to four employees in Norway. Lobbying alone was targeted towards 
the European Commission and the European Parliament. Among these two the European 
Commission was seen more as a target than the European Parliament. When Norsk Hydro 
lobbied alone in Germany and Slovakia it was conducted with the aim that the authorities 
there would represent their views further at the European level (interview 2010).  
Lobbying via EAA and Eurometaux was targeted towards all the EU institutions and these 
organizations had most contact with the Commission. Work on the issues related to the EU 
ETS is divided between these two organizations. The EAA administers environmental issues, 
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topics related to direct emissions and benchmarking, and Eurometaux works on issues related 
to energy and thus on the indirect effects of the EU ETS (interview 2010). These two were 
equally important as lobbying tactics and there was extensive contact with both of the 
associations in the form of calls, meetings and e-mails. There was contact at least weekly and 
most often via e-mail (interview 2010). The initiative for cooperation between Norsk Hydro 
and these associations was typically coming from the associations as these follow the policy-
making process in the EU, bring up relevant issues for the aluminum industry, and organize 
meetings where the industry response is discussed. Norsk Hydro has been very active in both 
of these organizations and expressed satisfaction with their work, even though there are 
always some compromises to be made. That was seen as a natural part of the process 
(interview 2010). For participating effectively in the EAA and Eurometaux, Norsk Hydro was 
very much prepared to secure the quality of their positions inside the European associations. 
For about two years ago Hydro went through all their memberships in various organizations 
and re-organized the internal work with the aim that those participating in the organizations 
would be as well-prepared as possible. As a result, Norsk Hydro is taken seriously in the 
organizations: ―The feedback is that when our corporate management people go into 
meetings, they have clout. They are better prepared than most‖ (interview 2010). Thus, the 
usefulness of an association to a firm might not only depend on the characteristics of the 
association, but also on the member company itself. 
The EAA reported lobbying during the revision of the EU ETS both before and after the 
proposal. In 2006 it worked towards the exclusion of the aluminum sector from the EU ETS 
and instead raised other possibilities (EAA, not dated a: 11). In 2007 the EAA continued with 
efforts on this issue and lobbied the Commission and key member states
22
 with the aim of 
finding an alternative solution for the aluminum sector instead of the EU ETS. These attempts 
were not fruitful as during the year it became clear that both primary and secondary aluminum 
production was to be included into the EU ETS from 2013. Therefore the efforts shifted from 
opposing the inclusion of the aluminum production to finding solutions to compensate the 
CO2 component of (an expected increase in) power prices, as there were no clear provisions 
for it in the proposal (EAA, not dated b: 9). Lobbying continued thus in 2008 and according to 
the EAA resulted in a possibility of free allocation for direct emissions, if it were to be 
                                                 
22
 The EAA did not identify the key members states in their report. 
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considered exposed to carbon leakage.
23
 Also a possibility of receiving a compensation from 
the member states for the CO2 cost in the power price (indirect effect of the EU ETS) for the 
sectors exposed to carbon leakage (EAA, not dated c: 11). The EAA also provided a position 
paper during the EU ETS revision (EAA 2005). 
Eurometaux has no public documents, such as annual or activity reports from the review 
period, where they would explain the lobbying actions during the review process. This does 
not imply that the organization did not participate in the policy-making process, but highlights 
again one crucial problem for anybody studying lobbying – documentation of lobbying 
activities is so rare that sometimes even large European associations do not provide 
documentation of their work. Eurometaux was present in the review process and put forward 
two joint position papers together with other industry organizations, among them also the 
EAA (The Key Stakeholders Alliance for ETS Review 2007; Alliance of Energy Intensive 
Industries, CEFIC & IFIEC 2007). 
Norsk Hydro also has plants in other EU member states and lobbying via their national 
associations, especially in Germany and Slovakia, took place. This tactic was first targeted 
towards the corresponding national institutions and secondly towards all of the EU institutions 
via the national institutions. Using the German association was emphasized due to German 
membership and general importance in the EU (interview 2010).  
However, the Federation of Norwegian Industries was used less compared to other tactics and 
lobbying via it was targeted only towards the Norwegian institutions. There were considerable 
differences between the issues that were discussed via the Federation of Norwegian Industries 
at the national level and via tactics at the European level. In Norway the main issue was 
linking Norway to the EU ETS with ―a level playing field‖ so that the implementation of the 
EU ETS in Norway would not differ from the European Union. At the European level 
lobbying took place on the issues of the design of the revised directive. Lobbying directly and 
via the EAA and Eurometaux was evaluated being much more effective than lobbying via the 
Federation of Norwegian Industries, as the first two provide much better access to the 
European Union institutions.  The Federation of Norwegian Industries plays a useful role as a 
                                                 
23
 Although the Directive did not mention at that time which sectors were considered as exposed to carbon 
leakage, it seems that the aluminum sector was quite sure already beforehand that it would be among these, 
as the EAA expressed satisfaction with the revised directive.  
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listening post bringing information back to Norway both to firms and authorities (interview 
2010).  
One option included under the tactics was not relevant for Hydro at all and that is lobbying in 
alliance with another company or an organization. The reasons for this are that when Hydro 
has been cooperating with other firms it has been under the umbrella associations, for 
example the EAA. E.g. when Hydro met politicians or officials together with another 
aluminum company, it was always on behalf of the EAA (interview 2010). The Hydro 
representative expressed that ―I don‟t think that we have been in situations, where we would 
need an alliance with another company on a specific issue‖ (interview 2010).  
When it comes to the targets, the Commission stands out, because ―they make the rules‖ and 
―they are doing the formulation of the legislation‖ (interview 2010). Therefore it was crucial 
for Hydro to follow the policy-making process from the beginning. The lobbying actions 
intensified somewhat after the Commission put the proposal forward, but the change was not 
prominent. Lobbying after the proposal took a more specific form:”When you get the 
proposal, it is easier to say that this we need to change. /…/ Then you have an objective that 
this needs to be changed from this to that‖ (interview 2010).  
Figure 6.1. Lobbying routes of Norsk Hydro 
 
* The straight line marks the most-used lobbying routes, while the dotted line marks routes  
that were also in use, but not as important as the others. 
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Based on the above, it can be concluded that Norsk Hydro used the following lobbying routes 
most:  
 Direct lobbying towards the Commission, but also towards the European Parliament. 
 Lobbying via the European associations towards all of the European institutions, but 
especially towards the Commission.  
 Lobbying through national associations in Slovakia and especially Germany at the national 
institutions there. 
  Lobbying via German and Slovakian institutions was targeted towards all the EU 
institutions.  
There was also lobbying activity through these lobbying routes: 
 Lobbying alone towards German (and also to some degree Slovakian) authorities  
 Lobbying via the Federation of Norwegian Industries was conducted on the national level 
but it was least relevant of all the routes used  
5.2 Norcem – the fastest way to the heart of the EU 
goes through a parent and international cement 
friends 
Norcem is the only cement producer in Norway and is part of the HeidelbergCement Group.  
In 2007 Norcem‘s revenue was approximately 1.4 billion NOK. Norcem has two cement 
plants in Norway (Norcem, not dated: 4). Norcem is a member in the Federation of 
Norwegian industries as well as in CEMBUREAU. As the only cement producer in Norway, 
Norcem represents Norwegian cement production in international associations.  
Norcem has been active in the climate related policy-making processes since the nineties as 
cement production results in high emissions. Therefore Norcem chose to be involved early in 
the policy-making discussions concerning Norway‘s connection to emissions trading. The EU 
ETS‘s design as such has been relevant due to high emissions from cement production but not 
as much as implementing the EU ETS in Norway. Especially of high importance was 
achieving the same rules in Norway as in the European Union due to the competitive situation 
of Norcem in relation to cement producers in EU countries (interview 2010). The company 
sees the necessity for the tougher EU ETS scheme compared to the first and second phase 
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from the viewpoint of the environmental effectiveness and the need for reducing emissions. 
Nonetheless, the company representative noted that the stricter rules from 2013 will definitely 
have consequences both for Norcem and the European cement production in general 
(interview 2010).  
Norcem particularly used the following lobbying tactics during the revision process – 
lobbying via CEMBUREAU and via the Federation of Norwegian Industries. The 
―CEMBUREAU route‖ was considered to be the most important tactic of all because the 
cement producers managed to agree and thus interests and views on the ETS could be 
represented as inherent to the entire industry (interview 2010). The relevance of ―speaking 
with one voice‖ is illustrated well in a following statement by the company representative: ‖ 
These associations, if they can‟t present a common view, they can‟t play their role any more‖ 
(interview 2010). Apparently, CEMBUREAU did manage to combine different opinions 
inside the cement industry. There was extensive contact between CEMBUREAU and 
Norcem. Norcem receives often requests for feedback from CEMBUREAU and is clearly 
satisfied with CEMBUREAU‘s work on representing their interests during the revision of the 
EU ETS. At the same time most of the lobbying work through CEMBUREAU is either 
coordinated with or conducted via HeidelbergCement‘s Brussel‘s office. There is contact 
between Norcem and HeidelbergCement in Brussel several times a week in the form of phone 
calls, e-mails, web/telephone conferences, and sometimes face-to-face meetings (interview 
2010). Feedback and information to CEMBUREAU is thus coordinated between the different 
subsidiaries to HeidelbergCement, which points to the importance of ―speaking with one 
voice‖ not only for associations, but also for related companies. However, there was also 
direct contact between Norcem and CEMBUREAU, but only about a couple times a month 
and mostly via telephone and e-mail (interview 2010).  
The lobbying route via CEMBUREAU was targeted at all of the EU institutions, while it is 
difficult to say from Norcem‘s viewpoint at which institution the lobbying efforts were 
targeted most. This decision was done to a large degree at CEMBUREAU, which followed 
the policy-making process tightly (interview 2010). CEMBUREAU felt that the EU had not 
taken into account different problems from the pilot phase when starting with the EU ETS 
review (CEMBUREAU 2007b: 9, 13). In 2007 CEMBUREAU had extensive contacts with 
the Commission and especially with the DG Environment, but also to some degree at the 
European Parliament and with the Presidencies (CEMBUREAU 2008: 16). EU ETS was one 
of the main issues and therefore CEMBUREAU participated actively in the consultation. The 
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proposal for the new directive was not seen as satisfactory and thus CEMBUREAU stated the 
significance of continuing with lobbying efforts (ibid: 19). During 2008 CEMBUREAU 
focused extensively on participating in the debate on the design of the new directive and 
especially the second half of the year saw extensive work on demonstrating that cement 
production must be considered exposed to carbon leakage (CEMBUREAU 2009: 19). 
CEMBUREAU participated also in the revision process with other energy intensive industry 
sectors and took part of two formal position papers contributed to the Commission (The Key 
Stakeholders Alliance for ETS Review 2007; Alliance of Energy Intensive Industries,  CEFIC 
& IFIEC, 2007) and provided also a separate position paper (CEMBUREAU 2007a). 
In Norway, Norcem lobbied at the national institutions first and foremost via the Federation of 
Norwegian Industries. Also for Norcem the issues discussed in Norway had to do with linking 
Norway to the EU ETS under equal rules:‖It has been all the time Norcem‟s view, and here 
we follow the Federation of Norwegian Industries, we shall not have it easier than the EU, we 
shall not have it tougher, we shall have the same rules‖ (interview 2010). As the issue under 
discussion was of national character, lobbying at the national level was not conducted to have 
interests represented further at the European level. Nevertheless, it only took place to a small 
degree through Norwegian authorities‘ contacts in the European Union. It was not considered 
relevant:‖ In some questions they [EU] listen to us [Norway], but I don‟t think this question is 
one of them. In the matters of energy and fishing, then they listen to us‖(interview 2010). 
Norcem was not very active in direct lobbying in Norway. However, as many other industries, 
Norcem is visited by Members of the Norwegian Parliament (especially before the elections). 
At such occasions Norcem always made sure to mention the ―EU ETS issue‖ with specific 
focus on linking Norway to the ETS with a ―level playing field‖ (interview 2010).  
Norcem as a company did not undertake any direct lobbying at the European level and it does 
not have an office in Brussels that would deal with governmental or EU affairs. However, it is 
important to note that the mother company HeidelbergCement Group that has an office in 
Brussels working with European affairs conducted direct lobbying actions at the European 
level. Even then lobbying actions were usually coordinated with CEMBUREAU. 
HeidelbergCement Group undertook most direct lobbying at the European Parliament, 
although there was also direct contact with the Commission and the Council (interview 2010). 
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In addition, Norcem cooperated in conducting lobbying in Norway with the lime industry, 
mainly with Franzefoss Miljøkalk. This alliance was created because the lime and cement 
industry face similar challenges in the EU ETS due to similar technological processes and a 
large part of the emissions are process-related (interview 2010). Lobbying in alliance was 
targeted at the politicians and officials both at the wider national level and at the local level in 
areas where the companies had production plants. That was complementary to activities in the 
Federation of Norwegian Industries, but always coordinated with them. The coordination took 
the form of Norcem and Franzefoss informing the Federation before and after the meetings 
about topics and results (interview 2010).  
Figure 6.2. Lobbying routes of Norcem 
 
* The straight line marks the most-used lobbying routes, while the dotted line marks routes  
that were also in use, but not as important as the others. 
All in all, it can be concluded that Norcem used especially certain lobbying routes:  
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state which of the EU institutions was prevalent in this route. 
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 In alliance with Franzefoss at the national institutions. 
 Lobbying alone at the national institutions. 
5.3 Cementa AB – subsidiary and team player 
Cementa AB is the only cement producer in Sweden and a subsidiary to HeidelbergCement. 
In 2007 Cementa‘s revenue was 1.8 billion SEK, which at that time was about 1.56 billion 
NOK. Cementa has three cement production plants in Sweden (Cementa AB, not dated: 4). 
Cementa is a member in CEMBUREAU, where it represents Swedish cement production, as 
there is no cement association in Sweden.    
The EU ETS has been all the time an issue of high importance for Cementa as it is both 
affected directly due to high emissions from production and indirectly due to (rising) power 
prices. Therefore Cementa has been participating in and following the policy-making from the 
very beginning. It was crucial for Cementa that cement was considered to be a sector exposed 
to carbon leakage, because both the direct and indirect effect of the ETS without free 
allocation would quite probably have resulted in plant closures (interview 2010). Cementa 
was active during the revision process and especially two tactics stand out – lobbying via 
national associations and via CEMBUREAU.  
The most important tactic for Cementa was lobbying through the national associations at the 
national level during the revision process. That took place firstly with the Swedish Plastics & 
Chemicals Federation, which is an association for plastic and chemical manufacturers and 
suppliers. Secondly, Cementa has been cooperating with SveMin, which is an association for 
mining, metal and mineral producers. Cementa has been involved in these organizations due 
to several reasons. First, since Cementa is the only cement producer in Sweden there is no 
cement association. Secondly, Cementa has common views and faces similar issues with these 
industries regarding the EU ETS. The Swedish Enterprise, which is an umbrella association 
for the private sector in Sweden, was not used as a lobbying tactic. It combines very different 
sectors and thus Cementa‘s interests ―would get very diluted‖ (interview 2010). Thirdly, 
SveMin and Swedish Plastics & Chemicals Federation have very competent experts working 
on the issues of emission trading. Swedish officials and politicians who represent Sweden in 
different EU institutions, especially representatives from Swedish ministries, also approached 
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these associations. They asked for knowledge because there is not always extensive 
information flow from the EU institutions to Swedish national institutions (interview 2010). 
Lobbying through the national associations was targeted first towards national institutions. 
However, the national institutions functioned sometimes as tactics as lobbying was targeted 
via these to the Council and to the EP. Lobbying via national institutions was the main route 
to the Council, because it was not possible to go directly to the Council: ”The ministries are 
participating in the Council /…/, we can‟t go directly to the Council, we have to go through 
the ministries. I think it is because we can lobby on a certain level /…/ but then they close the 
doors and have to decide/…/‖ (interview 2010).  
Lobbying via CEMBUREAU was another extensively used lobbying route. Lobbying via 
CEMBUREAU is beneficial because it takes a significant workload from the companies as 
they analyze EU documents, prepare feedback, gather data and opinions from their members. 
Such activities would be too burdensome for a single company (interview 2010). Secondly, 
using CEMBUREAU provides a possibility of ―speaking with one voice‖ and thus the entire 
European cement industry is represented, which gives more clout to their views.  Lobbying 
via CEMBUREAU was targeted most towards the Commission. When Cementa lobbied via 
CEMBUREAU, the actions were usually coordinated with other companies from 
HeidelbergCement. HeidelbergCement has assembled an expert committee that discusses the 
ETS issues before participating in the CEMBUREAU. Cementa was very satisfied with 
CEMBUREAUs work during the revision of the EU ETS (interview 2010).  
The decision on how to act and where to lobby was to a large degree taken at CEMBUREAU, 
but they acted on the behalf of the companies. During the revision CEMBUREAU also asked 
Cementa to directly contact Swedish MEPs. Lobbying so late in the policy-making phase was 
not easy (interview 2010). CEMBUREAU had prepared a list on items that were to be voted 
on in the EP and Cementa then provided the Swedish MEPs with their opinions and 
information. On the other hand, such activities were considered as both being too late in the 
policy-making process and incompatible with the Swedish tradition. This is well illustrated by 
a humorous note from the company representative: ‖In Sweden we don‟t like coming this late 
and try to strangle: „You must vote this way!‟‖ (interview 2010).   
Cementa rarely used lobbying alone either at the European level or at the national level and 
Cementa has no office in Brussels that would work with government affairs. On the other 
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hand, Cementa‘s lobbying was coordinated via HeidelbergCement‘s office and then according 
to the representative, it was targeted at the Commission.
24
 As mentioned before, direct 
lobbying by Cementa was somewhat used at the European Parliament upon request of 
CEMBUREAU. In Sweden, there were some contacts between the top management and 
Swedish politicians, but only on special issues (interview 2010).  
Lobbying in alliance with another company or organization was not relevant for Cementa. 
The cooperation on the EU ETS took place already under national associations where the 
probable allies were present. However, in the early years of the EU ETS there was 
cooperation with lime industry in Sweden (interview 2010).  
Figure 6.3. Lobbying routes of Cementa 
 
* The straight line marks the most-used lobbying routes, while the dotted line marks routes  
that were also in use, but not as important as the others. 
In conclusion the lobbying routes used by Cementa were the following: 
 Lobbing via national associations at the national institutions 
 Lobbying via national institutions was targeted especially at the Council, but also at the 
Parliament. 
                                                 
24
 The Norcem representative mentioned that lobbying via HeidelbergCement was targeted at all EU 
institutions and most at the Parliament; the discussion of this finding and implications is presented in section 
5.7.2. 
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 Lobbying via CEMBUREAU was targeted at all the EU institutions and particularly at the 
Commission. While lobbying at the EU level, the lobbying actions were to a large degree 
coordinated with other companies from the HeidelbergCement.  
 Via HeidelbergCement at the European Commission. 
 Direct lobbying took place to some degree both at the national institutions and the 
European Parliament. 
5.4 Svenska Cellulosa Aktiebolaget – teaming up 
everywhere 
SCA is a large Swedish pulp and paper manufacturer and produces consumer goods such as 
tissues, diapers and personal care products. In 2007 SCA‘s revenue was approximately 107 
billion SEK, which at that time was about 92 billion NOK (SCA 2008: 18). Most of SCA‘s 
sales and assets are in Europe (SCA 2008: 82). SCA is a member of the Swedish Forest 
Industries Federation and in other national associations in countries were SCA has 
manufacturing. At the EU level SCA is a member in CEPI, directly and through the Swedish 
Forest Industries Federation. SCA has also an office in Brussels that works with EU affairs 
(interview 2010). 
The main concern for SCA was the indirect effect on power prices. When the EU ETS started 
in 2005, the impact on power prices was quite strong but the market collapsed in early 2006. 
Prior to the functioning of the EU ETS SCA had expected CO2 prices of around 40 Euros per 
ton. During the collapse the prices fell significantly, in the end of April 2006 the CO2 prices 
started to fall and stabilized around 15 Euros per ton. The prices fell further in 2007, reaching 
rock bottom around 1 Euro per ton and remained at this level until the end of the year and 
started to rise slowly towards the end of March 2008 (European Energy Exchange 2010). 
Looking back, in 2007 and 2008 there was less focus on lobbying on the ETS than it should 
have been. In a way the European paper industry “slept in class” (interview 2010). 
Nevertheless, lobbying activities were undertaken by SCA. 
SCA used particularly two tactics – lobbying via CEPI and via the Swedish Forest Industries 
Federation. The latter was at that period more important as a tactic than lobbying actions 
through CEPI. Lobbying has been mainly conducted via these associations from the start of 
the EU ETS (interview 2010).  
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CEPI was used to gain enough clout at the European level:”To really be strong as an industry 
we need to act together on the European level and this is through CEPI‖ (interview 2010). 
The representative for SCA attended meetings in CEPI about 4 times a year and there is 
communication almost every day between SCA and CEPI, mostly via e-mail. The SCA 
representative participated in the ―Climate Change and Energy Committee‖ where main EU 
ETS issues are discussed and this division was created in 2007 (interview 2010). SCA 
participates in different committees in CEPI and is represented both as a company and as the 
Swedish Forest Industries Federation‘s representative. When it comes to the issues of the 
ETS, all actions are first coordinated with the Swedish Forest Industries Federation and when 
the company representative was participating in the energy committee, he was representing 
the Federation (interview 2010). 
SCA is satisfied with CEPI‘s work in this issue. There were some differences of opinions 
between the companies, but ―at the end of the day, we have managed to agree‖ (interview 
2010). The European paper companies differ in raw material supply, paper types produced 
and mill types, therefore the opinions on the ETS were somewhat diverging inside CEPI. In 
spite of these differences the various opinions were merged when designing common 
positions and CEPI was extensively used in lobbying. CEPI‘s work was targeted at all the EU 
institutions, and then mostly to the Commission and least to the Council (interview 2010). 
CEPI has a good network and a good standing in the EU and the initiative for contact takes 
place both ways – CEPI contacts the EU policy-makers and the policy-makers do also contact 
CEPI (interview 2010).  
CEPI has not provided any overview of their lobbying activities and contacts in any of their 
reports during that time; therefore it is difficult to provide any additional information on 
which institutions were lobbied by CEPI. However, CEPI was part of two formal position 
papers contributed to the Commission in cooperation with other energy intensive industry 
sectors (The Key Stakeholders Alliance for ETS Review 2007; Alliance of Energy Intensive 
Industries, CEFIC & IFIEC 2007). 
There are extensive contacts between the SCA and the Swedish Forest Industries Federation, 
they meet at least four times a year and e-mail almost every day. In addition to participating in 
CEPI, the Swedish Forest Industries Federation was also used for lobbying national 
institutions and authorities in Sweden as well as the European Parliament. The same can be 
said about SCA‘s lobbying via national associations in other countries. When the national 
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institutions were lobbied, these functioned as targets on issues that were of national character, 
but were used as tactics for representation at all the three EU institutions considered here. 
Most important of these was the Commission, because it was seen as the policy designer 
(interview 2010).  
Lobbying alone has not been relevant because the associations are useful tactics, and because 
a solitary approach is costly and lacks clout:”I cannot complain about any of those 
associations. /…/ It is important for us as companies, you cannot have people working full 
time on lobbying in our business. It is something that costs money and you don‟t have such 
resources in this type of business” (interview 2010). The forest and paper industry is not large 
in Europe, both in terms of turnover and people employed. Companies from this sector have 
more clout when joining forces (interview 2010).  
It is also important to note, that there were some differences in the lobbying routes used 
between 2007 and 2008. In 2007 the focus was more on the national association – the 
Swedish Forest Industries Federation, while towards the end of the 2008, the focus shifted 
more towards CEPI (interview 2010).  
Figure 6.4. Lobbying routes of SCA 
 
* The straight line marks the most-used lobbying routes, while the dotted line marks routes  
that were also in use, but not as important as the others. 
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In conclusion, the following lobbying routes were used by the SCA during the revision of the 
EU ETS: 
 Lobbying via Swedish Forest Industries Federation in Sweden and national associations in 
other states was targeted towards the European Parliament. 
 Lobbying via CEPI was targeted at all of the EU institutions, but especially at the 
Commission.  
 SCA lobbied through the Swedish Forest Industries Federation towards the national 
institutions in Sweden and through national associations in other countries towards the 
national institutions there. On topics related to the EU ETS in general lobbying via national 
institutions was targeted further at all of the EU institutions.  
5.5 SSAB AB – together and a bit alone 
SSAB is a Swedish steel manufacturing company. In 2007 the total revenue of SSAB was 
47.7 billion SEK (SSAB 2008: 7), which at that time was about 42 billion NOK. SSAB has 
four steel mills, two in Sweden and two in North America (interview 2010). SSAB is a 
member of the Swedish Steel Producers' Association in Sweden and EUROFER in the EU. 
SSAB has not an office in Brussels that would work with EU affairs. 
The EU ETS has been a significant issue for SSAB as steel productions‘ use of coal, coke, oil 
natural gas, and liquefied petroleum gas in the production process results in high emissions 
(SSAB 2008: 23). In Sweden the steel production is iron ore based (SSAB 2010). Iron ore is 
reduced by coal in blast furnaces and carbon dioxide is formed as a by-product (SSAB 2008: 
23). Although SSAB‘s production of steel at the world‘s forefront when comparing to other 
steel production in terms of low emissions of carbon dioxide per ton of steel (ibid), it has high 
emissions nonetheless and therefore SSAB also prioritizes the work on reducing emissions 
(interview 2010). The problem for SSAB is that current technology does not allow for much 
further reduction of direct emissions. This was the reason why SSAB advocated for a 
benchmarking system and they would have preferred an allocation of post-production 
allowances (interview 2010). 
SSAB used three tactics during lobbying on the revision of the EU ETS – lobbying directly, 
via EUROFER and via the Swedish Steel Producers‘ Association. Most important of these 
was EUROFER, although the company representative noted that is important to be active 
60 
 
through all the channels and at all possible levels. Lobbying in alliance with another company 
was not used as a tactic as the most probable cooperation partners were other steel companies 
with which SSAB already cooperated in the Swedish Steel Producers' Association and 
EUROFER (interview 2010). SSAB did not have a separate opinion from EUROFER, as the 
steel industry in Europe was very united on the issue of the EU ETS. The common concern 
for all the steel companies was the risk of ending up with a scheme that would force the steel 
industry out of Europe. SSAB is satisfied with EUROFER‘s work on the issue of the EU ETS 
and it did participate in EUROFER both directly and through the Swedish Steel Producers' 
Association. SSAB would have preferred being able to be more active inside EUROFER by 
attending more meetings and giving more feedback on different drafts, but such activities 
were limited by the few people working on the issues of the EU ETS in SSAB (interview 
2010). On the other hand, when the Swedish Steel Producers' Association is participating in 
EUROFER, they always have SSAB‘s position.  Sometimes it is also beneficial to participate 
through the Swedish Steel Producers' Association: the Swedish industry is then perceived as 
united and has a stronger voice in EUROFER (interview 2010). There was direct contact 
between SSAB and EUROFER every week, mostly via-email. Lobbying via EUROFER was 
targeted at the European Parliament and the Commission. The latter was the most important 
target for EUROFER.  
After the Commission initiated the revision of the EU ETS, EUROFER became very active in 
its advocacy activities. It proposed an alternative ―Baseline and Credit‖ system to the EU ETS 
in March 2007 that according to their yearly report was better at providing a level playing 
field in competition with other steel producers outside of Europe (EUROFER 2008: 18). It is 
in fact a position that EUROFER has had all the time. As a reply to the Commission‘s Green 
Paper on emission trading in 2000, EUROFER very specifically emphasized the need to avoid 
distorting competition (EUROFER 2000). During 2007 it became clear that the EUROFER‘s 
proposed alternative did not gain enough support, because ―the Commission and Member 
States were too wedded to a cap-and-trade system, which had the political attraction of 
setting out the reduction target in advance‖ (EUROFER 2008: 18) and thus the efforts were 
turned to advocating a benchmark system. To do so effectively, EUROFER cooperated with 
other European level industry associations (EUROFER 2008: 18). Two joint position papers 
were put forward in 2007 with several other industrial European associations (The Key 
Stakeholders Alliance for ETS Review 2007; Alliance of Energy Intensive Industries, CEFIC 
& IFIEC 2007). When the Commission put forward the proposal for the revised directive in 
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January 2008, EUROFER was dissatisfied with it. Especially because the criteria for free 
allocation to sectors exposed to carbon leakage and the means to protect the competitive 
situation of industries remained undefined (EUROFER 2008: 19). The lobbying work thus 
continued. EUROFER was quite satisfied with the final directive as it provided clarified 
criteria for defining sectors exposed to carbon leakage and clear statements that those would 
receive free allocations based on their benchmarks and also the possibility of free allocation 
for waste gases (EUROFER 2009: 17). Although EUROFER does not mention it implicitly, it 
seems that it did lobby all the institutions during the revision process. For example, in 2007 it 
reported having extensive meetings with the Commission and Member States (EUROFER 
2008: 17) and in 2008 having good access to all key political players (EUROFER 2009: 17).  
As pointed out above, SSAB was very active in the Swedish Steel Producers' Association and 
as the largest steel producer in Sweden it had a good standing in the association. There was 
contact between the Swedish Steel Producers' Association and SSAB at least every week by 
phone calls and e-mails as well as occasional meetings. The CEO of SSAB is the chairman of 
the Council in the Swedish Steel Producers' Association. Lobbying via the Swedish Steel 
Producers' Association was targeted to the national institutions and also to the Council and 
European Parliament‘s Swedish representatives. Among these three the Council was the most 
important target (interview 2010).  
Lobbying alone was least important of all the three tactics used while it was first and foremost 
targeted at the national institutions, but also towards the European Parliament and the 
Council. It is important to note that when the national institutions were lobbied either directly 
or via the national association, it was sometimes done with the aim that the national 
authorities would represent SSAB‘s interests further and sometimes not. When the topic was 
more of a national character, such as issues related to implementation the EU ETS in Sweden, 
the national institutions were lobbied as a final target; when the issues were related to the 
design of the scheme or the allowances allocated to Sweden that had to be approved by the 
EU, the national institutions were used as a tactic for gaining access to the all the EU 
institutions and specifically to the Council (interview 2010). 
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Figure 6.5. Lobbying routes of SSAB 
 
* The straight line marks the most-used lobbying routes, while the dotted line marks routes  
that were also in use, but not as important as the others. 
All in all, it can be concluded that the following lobbying routes were used by SSAB: 
 First and foremost lobbying was conducted via EUROFER that lobbied at the European 
Parliament and especially at the Commission. 
 Lobbying through the Swedish Steel Producers' Association was targeted both at the 
European Parliament and the national institutions.  
 National institutions were sometimes used as a tactic and lobbying via these was targeted 
at all of the EU institutions, but especially at the Council. 
 Lobbying alone was targeted at the national institutions, the European Parliament and the 
Council.  
5.6 Norske Skog – modest in its lobbying 
Norske Skog is a Norwegian paper manufacturer that produces newsprint and magazine 
paper. In 2007 Norske Skog had total revenue of 27 billion NOK (Norske Skog, not dated: 2) 
and in 2007 it owned 18 mills worldwide. Eight were in Europe and of these three in Norway 
(Norske Skog, not dated: 13). By 2010 this had been reduced to 13 mills, of which seven in 
Europe – three in Norway and four in other countries (interview 2010). Norske Skog is a 
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member of the Federation of Norwegian Industries in Norway and through this federation also 
a member in CEPI. Norske Skog has not been significantly economically affected by the EU 
ETS in the present period. The main effect from 2013 is expected to be on power prices but 
also on the number of allocations that must be bought in the period 2013-2020 (interview 
2010). Norske Skog does not have an office in Brussels.  
During the revision process, there were two main topics that Norske Skog focused on – design 
of the revised directive on the one hand and linking Norway to the EU ETS to get a ―level 
playing field‖ with producers in the EU on the other hand. Norske Skog saw the need for a 
stricter revised scheme, because there was clearly a too generous allocation for the period 
2008-2012 incompatible with the goals the EU had set (interview 2010). For Norske Skog the 
EU ETS has been only an addition to their internally set goals for cutting emissions: ”We 
decided early that when it comes to climate change, industry has to take the lead. We can in 
no way sit and wait for the politicians to agree” (interview 2010).  
Norske Skog was involved in lobby activities during the revision of the EU ETS and used two 
tactics especially – lobbying via the Federation of Norwegian Industries and via CEPI. 
Working through CEPI is the most effective lobbying tactic at the European level for Norske 
Skog because as Norway is not a member in the EU, CEPI provides an important channel into 
the EU. The company representative noted that CEPI did conduct lobbying activities at all of 
the relevant EU institutions, although it was difficult for him to say which of the EU 
institutions was targeted most by CEPI (interview 2010). However, the representative for 
SCA told that CEPI lobbied most at the Commission. Norske Skog is represented in CEPI 
through the Federation of Norwegian Industries and the CEO of Norske Skog is on the CEPI 
board. Work on the EU ETS also took place in different committees in CEPI and the Norske 
Skog representative participated in the Environmental Committee on behalf of the Federation 
of Norwegian Industries. This means that Norske Skog was directly involved in the 
discussions in CEPI. The EU ETS was discussed at meetings about 4-5 times a year. This was 
complemented with communication by phone calls and e-mails (interview 2010). Due to 
differing paper production
25
 among the European paper companies, there were several 
discussions inside CEPI. But these discussions did not destroy the cooperation inside CEPI, 
                                                 
25 
For example Norske Skog paper production is based on mechanical pulp, which requires more energy than 
chemical pulping. In addition, the energy use depends on whether recovered fibre is used (interview 2010).  
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because “everybody realized, that if we want to achieve something, we have to reach an 
agreement” (interview 2010).  
When Norske Skog lobbied through the Federation of Norwegian Industries, it was 
exclusively targeted at the Norwegian institutions and these were not used for representing 
Norske Skog‘s views further to the European Union. This was due to the fact that Norway is 
not a member of the European Union and thus the national institutions do not have the so 
good possibilities to influence the decision-making in the EU (interview 2010). It is important 
to note that the issues discussed at the Federation of Norwegian Industries and at CEPI were 
divergent also for Norske Skog, with a discussion in Norway on linking Norway to the EU 
ETS with a ―level playing-field‖. That was a crucial issue not only for Norske Skog, but also 
for all the other companies active in sectors that were included in the EU ETS (interview 
2010). Norske Skog is very satisfied with the Federation of Norwegian Industries‘ work on 
the EU ETS issues and cooperated actively in this association with other companies. The 
association‘s possibility to influence the political process in Norway was considered to be 
good:‖They are at least heard, politicians listen to them. Whether they decide [as the 
Federation of Norwegian Industries prefers] or not, we have to wait and see. But they have an 
open dialogue with the politicians” (interview 2010). There will always be some differences 
of opinions inside the Federation of Norwegian Industries. These were due to sectoral 
differences and did not interfere with the cooperation possibilities (interview 2010).  
Lobbying alone was not significant for Norske Skog at the European level because a company 
like Norske Skog that is mostly based outside of the European Union and small at the global 
level, would not be heard. This is illustrated by the company representative‘s comment on the 
question if there are companies that are able to lobby the European Union alone: “Yes, if you 
are Pepsi or Coca Cola” (interview 2010). However, Norske Skog lobbied towards 
Norwegian authorities at meetings at different levels alone or together with other pulp and 
paper companies, but always with statements that were in line with the Norwegian federation. 
Such lobbying should be seen thus complementary to lobbying via the Federation of 
Norwegian Industries and it was used to a much smaller degree than lobbying via the 
Federation, however the company representative considered such activities both as lobbying 
via the Federation and alone (interview 2010). 
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Lobbying in alliance was not a relevant option, because the companies that would have been 
the natural cooperation partners were already present in the Federation of Norwegian 
Industries and all cooperation in Norway took place under this association (interview 2010).  
It is also important to note that although Norske Skog has mills in EU countries, such as in 
Germany, France, the Netherlands and Austria, it did not lobby via these. The company 
representative mentioned however that such activities are possible. It has just one mill in each 
of these countries and thus is a small player. Furthermore all national associations are already 
represented in CEPI (interview 2010).  
Figure 6.6. Lobbying routes of Norske Skog. 
 
* The straight line marks the most-used lobbying routes, while the dotted line marks routes  
that were also in use, but not as important as the others. 
All in all, Norske Skog used the following lobbying routes: 
 Lobbying via CEPI towards all the EU institutions. 
 Lobbying via the Federation of Norwegian Industries was targeted at Norwegian 
institutions. 
 Lobbying alone was targeted at the national institutions, but it took place less frequently 
lobbying via the previously mentioned collective tactics and it was always done with common 
positions to the Federation of Norwegian Industries. 
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5.7 Similarities and differences between lobbying 
routes used by companies 
Above the lobbying profiles of each of the companies were drafted. To complete the picture 
on how the firms studied in this study lobbied, below the main similarities and differences 
between the companies are pointed out together with a general comparison of lobbying tactics 
used at the EU level. 
5.7.1 Similarities 
All the companies expressed the importance of using all the possibilities available and lobbied 
through different routes. At the same time, the companies did not use exactly the same routes 
when lobbying on the EU ETS. 
The lobbying tactic that was used by all companies extensively was lobbying through their 
EU association. Lobbying through the European associations was targeted at the EU 
institutions and apparently most towards the Commission. It is interesting to note that for 
several companies it was difficult to express which EU institution was lobbied most via their 
respective EU association, since the associations are extensively involved in planning and 
executing the advocacy plans. Nevertheless, the interviewees were clear that all activities are 
conducted on the behalf of the members (interviews 2010).  
Another common trait for all the firms studied here was the extensive use of the national 
associations. Lobbying via these was first and foremost targeted at the national institutions, 
while SCA and SSAB also lobbied through their respective national association at the 
European Parliament. With the exception of Norsk Hydro lobbying via national associations 
was either the most or second-most important tactic after lobbying via the European 
associations.  
When the companies used national associations, they did not use all existing ones. None of 
the companies, neither in Norway nor in Sweden, considered the national umbrella 
associations as the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO) in Norway or the 
Confederation of Swedish Enterprise as a tactic.  
Among the six companies only Norcem reported lobbying in an alliance with the lime sector 
and even then that was only an additional tactic that was used to some degree in Norway 
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(interview 2010). For all the other companies the option of lobbying in alliance was 
challenging to understand. They explained that their possible partners were already working 
with them in the associations. None of the companies cooperated with non-commercial actors 
in lobbying, although stating the reasons why such option was not relevant is not possible, it 
was just regarded as irrelevant (interviews 2010).  
Lobbying alone was used by five companies. In general, it was seen as a complementary 
tactic with less relevance than lobbying via associations. 
5.7.2 Differences 
As noted above, all companies used multiple lobbying routes. However, the number of used 
routes varies. One lobbying route consists usually of a tactic and of a target, but sometimes 
also national institutions were used as a tactic as lobbying via national institutions was further 
targeted at the EU institutions. If one is to count all the used lobbying routes mentioned by the 
firms as depicted on the schemes in the form of arrows
26
, there are large differences between 
companies. The list based on descending number of used routes is as follows: SCA and Norsk 
Hydro each used 13 routes
27
, SSAB 11, Cementa 9, Norcem 9, and Norske Skog 5. 
The most striking difference between the used lobbying routes of the Swedish and Norwegian 
companies studied here is in what kind of a role the national institutions have. For Norwegian 
companies the national institutions were the target, but for the Swedish companies the 
national institutions also functioned as a tactic when issues related to the whole EU ETS were 
discussed and the national institutions were used for contacting all the EU institutions.  
Another difference between the companies is that Norsk Hydro and SCA lobbied also via 
national associations and institutions in other countries where they have production. 
Lobbying alone was used by five of the companies, but only three used it at the EU level. For 
Norsk Hydro lobbying alone at the EU institutions was one of the main tactics and used first 
and foremost towards the Commission, but also to some degree the Parliament was lobbied 
directly. For Cementa, lobbying alone was used rarely at the EU level and then towards the 
                                                 
26
 Counting the lobbying routes by the arrows separates the routes lobbying at the national institutions and 
from them as the “input” and “output” is counted separately. This is further explained in section 3.2.3. 
27
 Here I have counted the use of national associations and national institutions in Germany and Slovakia 
together for Norsk Hydro. If I were to disaggregate these, the difference would be even larger. 
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European Parliament. SSAB did also some direct lobbying at the EU level towards the 
Parliament and at the Council. It is important to note, that according to SSAB and Cementa if 
direct lobbying was undertaken at the European level, it was targeted at the Swedish 
representatives there (interviews 2010).  
Related to lobbying alone is another interesting finding, namely that Norcem and Cementa 
both reported that their parent company HeidelbergCement was engaged in lobbying directly 
at the European level. The representative from Cementa said that HeidelbergCement had 
contact with the Commission, while the representative from Norcem told that 
HeidelbergCement was in contact with all of the EU institutions and most with the European 
Parliament. It points to the possibility of the collected data not being entirely correct. There 
was a limit to how extensive contact I could have with interviewees‘ with respect to their 
available time.  Clearing it out would have meant presenting the difference of answers to both 
representatives of Norcem and Cementa. As the companies are related it was anticipated that 
in addition to taking too much time and one of the representatives could probably just agree 
with the other. On the other hand, it is also possible that Norcem perceived the importance of 
HeidelbergCement as a lobbying tactic much higher and as providing access to different EU 
institutions, as it did not have the possibility of lobbying at the EU alone or via its national 
association Federation of Norwegian Industries. For these reasons I decided to use this 
somewhat diverging information as it is.  
5.7.3 Firms’ use of the tactics at each of the EU institutions 
Earlier in this chapter the lobbying profiles of each of the company were established. It is 
useful to establish a more general picture on which tactics were used and at which institutions 
to further understand the role of each tactic in lobbying at the EU institutions. These are 
depicted in figure 6.7. (see also table Appendix b). In the figure the national institutions and 
lobbying via the parent company are also represented for depicting these comparatively with 
other tactics. When a company has used one tactic twice for lobbying at a certain institution, it 
is also counted twice – Norsk Hydro lobbied the Commission both via Norwegian and 
German/Slovakian national institutions, SCA lobbied at the EP both via national associations 
in Sweden and in other EU member states. Thus lobbying via national associations and 
institutions in Sweden or Norway is separated from such activities in other states, but not 
further by the other countries for parsimony. I have neither separated the lobbying via national 
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institutions according to the original tactics that were used for lobbying at the national 
institutions, thus the national institutions are depicted as tactics.  
Figure 6.7. Frequency of using each tactic towards each of the EU institutions 
 
The most common tactic used at the EU level was lobbying via EU associations. It is also 
interesting that the second most used tactic at the EU level was lobbying via the national 
institutions, because it was used only by one of the three Norwegian companies – Norsk 
Hydro and then mostly in Germany and Slovakia, while all the three Swedish companies 
lobbied at the EU level via national institutions. Thus it seems that some tactics are more 
suitable for lobbying at the EU level than others. In the next chapter the possible influences on 
the differences and similarities among firms‘ lobbying routes are discussed. 
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6 The role of some causal factors 
The mapping of firms‘ lobbying routes in this study uncovered some similarities and 
differences between companies. How these can possibly be explained in the Norwegian and 
Swedish context and what the factors are for using one or another lobbying route will be 
explained in this chapter. 
In the theory chapter two main hypotheses with one sub-hypothesis under each were 
established based on various research on EU lobbying. These hypotheses are used as guidance 
for discussing possible influences on firms‘ lobbying.  
Hypothesis 1: Swedish and Norwegian firms differed in lobbying routes due to originating 
from a EU member state or non-member state. 
Hypothesis 1.1: Norwegian firms used more direct lobbying at the EU level than their 
Swedish counterparts due to their outsider status in the European associations and the 
lack of a ―member state patron‖ in the EU institutions. 
Hypothesis 2: Larger firms used more different routes than smaller firms. 
Hypothesis 2.1: Larger firms engaged in more direct lobbying at the EU level than 
smaller firms. 
The following analysis will first discuss differences between Swedish and Norwegian 
companies by focusing on the first two hypotheses. Secondly the size of the company will be 
scrutinized by addressing the two next hypotheses. Thirdly, some other possible influences 
are discussed under the hypotheses when these seem to have been relevant alternative 
explanations, but also separately to analyze some expected (such as policy-phase and conflict 
in the EU associations) and unexpected influences. 
6.1 Norwegian outsiders and Swedish insiders? 
6.1.1 Norwegian and Swedish firms’ use of lobbying tactics and 
access to EU institutions 
Hypothesis 1: Swedish and Norwegian firms differed in lobbying routes due to originating 
from a EU member state or non-member state. 
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This hypothesis was developed based on Eising (2007) and Bouwen‘s (2002b) somewhat 
conflicting studies, which was a consequence of Eising‘s focus on the supply-side (firms and 
associations) and Bouwen‘s on the demand side (EU institutions) in studying lobbying. Both 
authors studied private interests lobbying at different EU institutions. Eising (2007) studied 
how often and at which institutions firms, national associations and EU associations take 
contact, whereas Bouwen (2002b) focused on which organizational form of interest 
representation the three EU institutions prefer to consider. Although their results differ, they 
indicate that some tactics are more used or more suitable for lobbying at certain targets. 
Because Norwegian firms might encounter problems when using certain tactics, it can also 
mean that they have less access to some EU institutions. 
The use of each of the tactics by Norwegian and Swedish companies will be outlined below 
for evaluating if the hypothesis is supported or not among the companies investigated in this 
study. In the theory chapter one specific hypothesis about differences between Swedish and 
Norwegian companies in the use of direct lobbying was established. This is a suitable starting 
point for discussing differences and similarities between the Norwegian and Swedish firms as 
there seems to be a lack of literature that would discuss how firms from non-EU member 
states use other tactics besides direct lobbying. 
Lobbying alone 
Hypothesis 1.1: Norwegian firms used more direct lobbying at the EU level than their 
Swedish counterparts due to their outsider status in the European associations and the lack of 
―member state patron‖ in the EU institutions. 
Of the Norwegian companies included in this study, there was only one company that used 
direct lobbying towards the EU institutions, Norsk Hydro. Neither Norcem nor Norske Skog 
lobbied alone at the EU level. In comparison, two of the Swedish companies lobbied the EU 
institutions alone, Cementa and SSAB.  
Contrary to the hypothesis, the Norwegian firms studied here used less direct lobbying at the 
EU institutions than Swedish firms. Seen in the light of Bernhagen and Mitchell‘s (2009) 
study, their suggestion that firms from outside of the EU use more direct lobbying (and they 
especially noted Norwegian firms) does not seem to fit here. In fact, they found EU 
membership‘s positive effect on firms‘ direct lobbying, but considered it a result of lack of 
commercial activity in the EU in their quantitative study. As the EU ETS was considered an 
72 
 
important issue by the Norwegian firms and they did lobby via EU associations at the EU 
level, it is questionable that there was a lack of interest from the firms‘ side. Also, the 
representatives for Norcem and Norske Skog both told that they could not address EU 
institutions directly (interviews 2010). Therefore Bernhagen and Mitchell‘s (ibid) conclusion 
that due to the lack of a national patron in the EU the firms from outside of the EU would 
develop their own lobbying capabilities does not find much support in this study. The fact that 
they studied the world‘s 2000 largest firms (year 2005) may have played a role, however. 
Norcem and Cementa were not included in that list – whereas Heidelberg was. And most of 
the firms they studied were in general much larger than the firms studied here
28
 (Forbes 
2005). The findings here rather support Hamada‘s (2007) conclusion that Japanese firms 
struggled with gaining direct access to the EU institutions. 
Information from interviews with the Swedish companies supports the previous interpretation 
of these findings because when the representatives of Cementa and SSAB discussed direct 
lobbying, they focused on the Swedish EU representatives (interviews 2010). One of the 
interviewees stated that it would be very odd to lobby representatives from other EU states 
than Sweden (interview 2010). SSAB lobbied alone at the EP and the Council, and Cementa 
at the EP. Norsk Hydro‘s direct lobbying was targeted at all of the EU institutions, but 
especially at the Commission. Although I do not have information on which country 
representatives they lobbied, it points to the possibility that due to their non-member status in 
the EU and absence of a ―member state patron‖, Norwegian firms were less able to lobby 
directly at the EU and had less access to the Council and the Parliament. That the European 
Parliament was the most frequently accessed by direct lobbying is a somewhat surprising 
finding. Previously, the European Parliament has been described as less open to companies 
than to environmental NGOs (Gullberg 2008b: 2967; Lenshaw 2005: 315; Pedler 2002: 114). 
Moreover, the EP is, at least in principle, not organized according to member states as the 
Council is, but according to parties. How common such differences are in direct lobbying at 
the EU level among Norwegian and Swedish firms, or generally among firms from inside and 
outside the EU, would certainly be an interesting research topic for the future. 
  
                                                 
28
 For example Norsk Hydro ranks 959
th
 and SCA 454
th
 according to their composite ranking (Forbes 2005).  
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Lobbying via national associations 
Lobbying via national associations was a tactic that was used by all companies. They also 
emphasized it as a very important tactic (interviews 2010) when lobbying at the national 
institutions, regardless of whether they originated from Norway or Sweden.  However, while 
none of the three Norwegian firms used the Federation of Norwegian Industries for lobbying 
at the European institutions, two of the Swedish firms lobbied via their national associations 
at the EU institutions
29
 (interviews 2010). These were SCA and SSAB and via their respective 
national associations the former reported lobbying the European Parliament and the latter the 
European Parliament together with the Council (interviews 2010).  
These findings can most probably be explained by EU membership, or the lack thereof. First, 
as Norway is not a member in the EU, the Federation of Norwegian Industries has a role of a 
listening post in the EU to inform the policy-makers and companies in Norway about the 
developments in the EU (interviews 2010). Additionally, it is doubtful that the Swedish 
national associations were used for lobbying other states representatives‘ in the EP and the 
Council as the national associations represent clearly companies in their home country, in this 
case Sweden. It is also interesting to note that neither SCA nor SSAB lobbied the 
Commission via their national associations. Although it is too far-fetched to pose any certain 
claims based on the limited findings here, these seem to at least to some degree support 
Bouwen‘s (2002b) findings that of the three EU institutions, the Commission is the least open 
to national associations. At the same time Eising (2007: 394) found that national associations 
do have frequent contact with the Commission, if not more often than with the Parliament, 
and least with the Council
30. Thus the limited findings in this thesis rather support Bouwen‘s 
research than Eisings‘ results on which institutions are lobbied via national associations. 
These findings also suggest that Norwegian firms had not only less access to the EP and the 
Council when lobbying directly but also when lobbying via their national associations, since 
the Norwegian Federation of Industries was not used for lobbying at the EU institutions at all. 
The Federation of Norwegian Industries seems to be short of legitimacy vis-à-vis EU 
institutions, whereas the Swedish associations could be targeted at the Swedish 
                                                 
29
 It is possible that Cementa did that too; however, the representative of Cementa did not have a possibility to 
go over the company profile that is the base for the analysis before this thesis went to print. 
30
 As he studied firms’ contact on different levels in EU institutions, it is difficult to establish the difference 
between frequency of contacts with the Commission and with the Parliament. 
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representatives in the EP and the Council. National identity appears to be strong in these 
institutions. 
But before turning to analyzing a next tactic, it is interesting to note that not all the national 
associations were used for lobbying to the same degree. During the interviewing process it 
became clear that the Swedish companies did not use the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise 
and Norwegian firms did not lobby via the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise 
(interviews 2010). The reasoning was quite uniform; these organizations are too big and 
represent too many interests, including conflicting ones. One Swedish interviewee put it 
bluntly when he explained that they would not work much via the Confederation of Swedish 
Enterprise, because they represent all kind of interests, including power producers. Energy 
intensive industries‘ interests are at odds with power producers when it comes to the EU ETS: 
‖Power industry of course gained a lot from different activities and we paid‖ and thus via that 
organization they would not be able to convey a clear message (interview 2010). Greenwood 
(2003: 64) stated that the EU associations‘ ability to benefit their members depends on shared 
interests inside the association. The same can apparently be said about the national 
associations in this case. Such differences in the use of different types of national associations 
also points to the need to differentiate between narrower national sectoral associations and 
more general umbrella organizations as tactics when studying lobbying.  
National institutions: tactics for Swedish, targets for Norwegian companies 
Although all the companies used national associations to lobby at the national institutions, the 
role of these in firms‘ lobbying routes varied considerably between the Swedish and 
Norwegian companies. 
When Swedish companies lobbied Swedish national institutions, the national institutions 
functioned often as a tactic because lobbying via these was conducted towards the different 
EU institutions. This was clearly not the case for the Norwegian companies. Lobbying via 
Norwegian national institutions to the European institutions rarely took place. One Norwegian 
company, Norsk Hydro, did lobby extensively via national institutions in Slovakia and 
Germany at all the EU institutions, but not much via Norwegian institutions, whereas SCA 
lobbied at the EU level both via national institutions in Sweden and in other countries 
(interviews 2010).  
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It does not imply that the Norwegian politicians and officials never raised EU ETS issues with 
their colleagues from the EU institutions or member states. Rather it should be understood as 
that the firms were not seeing nor using the national institutions as relevant means for 
participating in the policy-making at the EU level. Based on the interviews conducted, there 
are at least two possible reasons that can explain why Norwegian firms lobbied the 
Norwegian national institutions as a final target. Firstly, there was an additional issue in 
Norway under debate – how to link Norway to the EU ETS. On the other hand, it is also 
possible that Norwegian politicians and officials just do not have the same access to the EU 
institutions and thus unable to represent Norwegian firms‘ views further.  
During the interviews in Norway, it became clear that one very crucial issue for all the 
companies was linking Norway to the EU ETS. When asked about how the EU ETS has 
influenced the firms and what were important issues, linking Norway always came up 
(interviews 2010). The process of linking Norway to the EU ETS is briefly summarized 
below. 
After the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 Norwegian officials started to examine 
possibilities for emission trading. However, linking Norway to the EU ETS took longer than 
planned and Norway was finally linked to the EU ETS from 2009 (Gullberg 2009).
31
 The 
process of linking Norway to the EU ETS brought discussions both inside the government and 
between the policy-makers and different companies and organizations. In the end of 2006 
Norway had asked the EU for a possibility of allocating fewer free allowances to the 
Norwegian industry than in the EU, and from 2013 to auction all allowances in Norway. This 
caused the industry in Norway to react and the administrative director Stein Lier-Hansen in 
the Federation of Norwegian industries called it a disaster (Ask 2007). There was no 
consensus inside the government either, as the Socialist Left Party of Norway (Sosialistisk 
Venstreparti) was supporting the auctioning while the Norwegian Labour Party (Det Norske 
Arbeiderparti) wanted to follow the EU rules (Mathismoen 2007). The government did not 
manage to fulfill its own promises that Norway would be linked to the EU ETS from 2008. 
Still, in 2008 there was a discussion on how the ETS should look like in Norway. Apparently 
                                                 
31
 Norway started its own emission trading that took place in 2005-2007. It was in fact quite narrow in scope as 
only 10 percent of Norwegian greenhouse gas emissions were included. A key reason was that the Norwegian 
Parliament was concerned about Norwegian industries’ competitive position. There was also a voluntary 
agreement between Norwegian industries and the Ministry of Environment to further reduce emissions 
(Presterud, Torvanger & Vevatne 2005). 
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Norway had designed a stricter national allocation plan that did not follow the EU ETS. The 
Minister of Finance (Kristin Halvorsen from the Socialist Left Party) had again confirmed that 
Norway will not have any free allocations from 2013 and there was no planned allocation to 
new installations in Norway contrary to the EU ETS. Such issues caused again the industry to 
strongly criticize the government‘s plans and sluggishness (Lier-Hansen 2008). 
Therefore it is not surprising that during the interviews in Norway, the interviewees 
emphasized that achieving the ―level playing field‖ in relation to producers in the EU was 
extremely crucial. Several of the interviewees expressed their dissatisfaction with the 
Norwegian policy-makers since it was unclear for a very long time how the system in Norway 
would be and because linking with the EU ETS was postponed (interviews 2010). As one 
interviewee phrased it: ―If there is something the industry does not like it is uncertainty‖ 
(interview 2010).  
In Sweden on the other hand, there was not such a difference in the issues discussed at the 
national level. When asked what the important issues were, the interviewees emphasized more 
specific design elements of the EU ETS from the period of 2012, such as for example 
allocation regimes, rules for deciding if a sector is exposed to carbon leakage and so on 
(interviews 2010). Thus it seems that in Norway the national arena was very much occupied 
with an internal debate of how to link Norway to the EU ETS and there was no more room to 
discuss how the EU ETS should be designed at the EU level.  
However, as mentioned before, the Norwegian officials and politicians do not have the access 
to the EU institutions to the same degree as their Swedish counterparts do. For example one 
Norwegian interviewee stated that ―Norway does not have a channel into the EU‖ (interviews 
2010) and another interviewee told that on this issue Norway does not have a say in the 
European Union (interviews 2010). However, the representative for the Federation of 
Norwegian Industries also pointed out that Norwegian officials and politicians could take a 
more active stance and communicate more with EU institutions since they tend to 
automatically see Norway as outside of the EU (interviews 2010). It is also possible that there 
was a lack of either will or ability inside the national institutions to represent the industry‘s 
views further at the EU level. 
Interestingly, this issue has gained some public interest lately. In November 2010 the media 
criticized Norwegian ministers for not focusing enough on EU politics and even downplaying 
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Norway‘s possibilities. Of 25 high-level meetings Norwegian ministers were invited to, they 
attended only 6 according to Aftenposten (Aale 2010). Provoked by this strong criticism, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre explained that Norway makes its EU policy also 
in other arenas than just at EU minister meetings since Norwegian ministers have to 
sometimes choose other duties than travelling to meet EU ministers (Støre 2010). Of course, 
there are many ways for political communication, but it is questionable that those other arenas 
can be so much more useful than high-level meetings. Another question is that if such 
ministerial meetings are not prioritized, how little attention is given to following more every-
day politics in the EU among the ministries? When describing the process of linking Norway 
to EU and criticizing the slowness and designing a plan, that was not accepted by the EU, one 
interviewee told that: ―The EU issues, these are not prioritized. It is a “left-hand” duty to 
some junior officials in many cases‖ (interview 2010). It was also indicated that Norwegian 
authorities do not actively seek to use less informal communication channels and rather use 
only the formal channels that come into effect late in the policy-making processes (interview 
2010).  
In general the Swedish firms studied here lobbied via national institutions at all the European 
institutions, and for two of the firms (Cementa and SSAB) lobbying via national institutions 
was most targeted at the Council. Thus the Norwegian firms probably had less access than 
Swedish firms to all of the EU institutions and especially to the Council due to lack of 
representation through the national institutions.  
The European associations 
Absolutely all the companies reported lobbying via their respective European associations 
(interviews 2010). Lobbying via the European associations was also a tactic that was used for 
lobbying at most targets in general. SSAB lobbied via EUROFER at the Commission and the 
European Parliament, while for all the other five firms lobbying via their respective European 
associations was targeted at all the three EU institutions (interviews 2010).  However, it 
seems that the Commission is the most common target when firms lobby via the EU 
associations. When discussing with the interviewees which EU institutions were lobbied via 
the European associations four out of six interviewees reported that most contact took place 
with the Commission (interviews 2010). However, three representatives also noted that even 
though there was most contact between the Commission and EU association, it does not mean 
that the Commission is more important than the other targets – more time allocated to an 
78 
 
institution does not necessarily mean that institution is more important than others (interviews 
2010). The European associations were seen as useful tactics for several reasons. Firstly, 
because the EU associations have duties that would be too difficult for a single company to 
conduct alone, such as monitoring policy and organizing feedback to the EU institutions. 
Secondly, to make one‘s voice heard at the European institutions it is important to be 
represented together with the entire industry (interviews 2010).  
Therefore, the claim that the EU associations are ―slow and sluggish‖ (Mazey & Richardson 
2006: 255) does not gain much support here. In fact, the EU associations were used 
extensively as a lobbying tactic even though the associations had varying number of members 
ranging from 19 to 69 and thus certain differences of opinions could have been anticipated. 
Nevertheless, none of the companies noted any conflict in the association that would have 
influenced how they conducted their lobbying
32
 (interviews 2010). As discussed in the 
methodology chapter earlier, firms might have been reluctant to share information on internal 
disagreement within EU associations. If there was any conflict among an association‘s 
members, it cannot have had much influence on firms‘ lobbying via the EU associations 
because the use of these was so prevalent.   
Other tactics – not all differences are due to EU membership 
So far one of the tactics has not been discussed: lobbying in alliance. The reason is that it was 
only used by Norcem. In addition to lobbying via the Federation of Norwegian Industries, 
Norcem also conducted lobby activities in alliance with the lime industry and mostly with 
Franzefoss Miljøkalk. Such activities were complementary to lobbying via the Federation of 
Norwegian Industries and always coordinated with the latter. The base for such an alliance 
was similar interests that originate from a similar technological production process and high 
direct CO2 emissions (interviews 2010). For the rest of the companies, lobbying in alliance 
was not relevant and the most usual reasoning was that they already cooperate with their 
possible alliance partners inside the national associations or European associations (interviews 
2010).  
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 However, it appears that at least one of the EU associations is experiencing quite serious conflict in 2010. At 
some point after the revision one cement company, Holcim, turned to disagreement with most other 
companies inside CEMBUREAU. They disagree with others on benchmarking and actively lobby alone and 
separately from the associations. This made one interviewee comment that at this point CEMBUREAU is playing 
music with a false key (interviews 2010).  
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Therefore it has to be concluded that although lobbying in alliance might be sometimes a 
useful tactic also at the European level and increase credibility to the presented positions 
(Coen 1999: 30) and make it easier to win a majority in the European Parliament (Gullberg 
2008b: 2969), the firms studied here did not see lobbying in alliance as a relevant option. 
Lobbying in alliance was not seen as a better alternative to lobbying via national and EU 
associations. Lobbying in alliance outside of the associations with another company may 
possibly be seen as undermining the collective lobbying efforts and as disloyalty, since 
lobbying ―together‖ was repeatedly emphasized during interviews.  
During the process of conducting this study, it became also clear that some companies possess 
exclusive tactics. Norcem and Cementa lobbied via their parent company HeidelbergCement 
Group and Norsk Hydro and SCA via national associations and institutions in countries where 
they have operations. 
Some first conclusions about the influence of originating from an EU member 
state 
Based on the above mentioned it can be concluded that Hypothesis 1 is supported among the 
companies studied as Norwegian and Swedish firms did differ in their use of tactics and, as a 
consequence, also in which institutions they targeted. Norwegian firms did encounter more 
difficulties than their Swedish counterparts when lobbying during the revision of the EU ETS. 
This is supported by several findings. First, Norwegian firms‘ lobbied less alone at the EU 
level and therefore Hypothesis 1.1 was not supported. Secondly, Norwegian firms lobbied 
also less via national associations than Swedish companies. Lobbying less alone and via 
national associations seem to result in less access to all of the EU institutions, and especially 
to the European Parliament and the Council. Secondly, Norwegian firms did not lobby at the 
EU level via Norwegian national institutions while Swedish firms did so via theirs. This 
seems to be resulting also in less access to all of the EU institutions and especially to the 
Council. There are three main probable reasons to why Norwegian national institutions were 
almost exclusively seen as lobbying targets. First, the domestic ―lobbying arena‖ was filled 
with a discussion on linking Norway to the EU ETS. Secondly, the Norwegian national 
institutions could not have been used for gaining access to the EU institutions because 
Norway is not a member and Norwegian politicians and officials have less access to EU 
institutions. Thirdly, there also seems to be a lack of ability or will by Norwegian officials to 
represent Norwegian firms‘ interests further at the EU level. 
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Nonetheless, there are also some similarities among the Swedish and Norwegian companies 
since the EU and national associations were used in general extensively. It also appears that 
for Norske Skog and Norcem, the use of the EU associations in lobbying can be understood as 
particularly important tactics because these functioned as the main path to access the EU 
institutions. Secondly, since national associations were important tactics for all the companies 
(even though how lobbying via these was targeted differed between Swedish and Norwegian 
companies) and lobbying alone was generally not a prevalent tactic (with the exception of 
Norsk Hydro), it points to the importance of being represented collectively both at the 
national and European level. It seems to be both because of the authorities preferring to hear 
wider positions and because of resource sharing among the companies.  
In addition there are also some differences that are not related to EU membership. Namely, 
that some companies used tactics simply unavailable to other firms – lobbying via a parent 
company or via national associations and institutions in more than one country. 
Although originating from a EU country seems to have an influence on which lobbying routes 
firms‘ used during the revision of the EU ETS, it did not explain all the differences between 
the companies. To gain further insight, the influences of company size are discussed next. 
6.2 Resources decide? 
In chapter 3 I raised two hypotheses related to the size of the company that in my thesis is 
measured by annual revenue in 2007. Below the reasoning for each of the hypotheses and 
findings among the companies studied in this thesis are given. 
Hypothesis 2. Larger firms used more different routes than smaller firms. 
This hypothesis was developed based on various research. Eising (2007) found that large 
firms
33
 have more contacts with different EU institutions than European and national 
associations have. This suggests that large firms have either more resources to be used for 
lobbying or are actively consulted by the EU institutions for feedback.  Coen and Dannreuther 
(2003) assert that not all firms have resources for activities at the European level and that 
SMEs have especially struggled in participating in the policy-making processes. For these 
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 Firms in his study were all labeled large, as he did not differentiate between firms with different sizes. 
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reasons I anticipated that larger firms would use more lobbying routes as they seem more 
capable of both direct lobbying and establishing a presence at the European level. 
To analyze if the findings support this hypothesis, it is useful to see, if the ranking of 
companies by revenue follows the ranking of companies according to the number of lobbying 
routes used. 
Table 6.1. Company size and number of lobbying routes 
Ranking of firms according to size 
(revenue in billion NOK) 
Ranking of firms according to the number of 
used lobbying routes (number) 
1. Norsk Hydro (94) Norsk Hydro (13) 
2. SCA (92) SCA (13) 
3. SSAB (42) SSAB (11) 
4. Norske Skog (27) Cementa (9) 
5. Cementa (1.56) Norcem (9) 
6. Norcem (1.4) Norske Skog (5) 
Firstly, this ranking follows the size of the companies, with one exception – Norske Skog 
used the smallest amount of different lobbying routes. If the hypothesis was to be supported 
fully, it would have used more lobbying routes than Norcem and Cementa. Secondly, we 
should not overlook the fact that Norske Skog used the least routes among all the companies 
and this could be also due to originating from a non-EU country, Norway. Thirdly, it is also 
interesting to note that both Norsk Hydro and SSAB used many lobbying routes and were 
followed by the cement companies. This makes it possible that there were also some sectoral 
influences. At the same time, this explanation loses some of its explanation power as one 
paper company is on the top of the list and one on the bottom based on the number of 
lobbying routes used. All these aspects are discussed below. 
SCA and Norsk Hydro were able to use that many routes because of their production in other 
countries, which allowed them use both national associations and national institutions in these 
countries for lobbying. Most of the other companies did not have such possibilities. 
Production and revenue is related since more production provides more revenue. Cross-border 
production was put forward by Coen (2007: 339) as a reason for companies gaining insider 
status in the Commission. Based on the limited findings here, it seems that the cross-border 
production also influences the number of available lobbying routes for the companies. If we 
leave out the lobbying routes used in other countries, then Norsk Hydro and SCA are both left 
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with 8 lobbying routes only. The role of lobbying via national associations and institutions in 
other countries would be even more emphasized if lobbying in each of the countries would 
have been considered separately, not aggregated, as chosen in this study to retain parsimony.  
But also Cementa and Norcem lobbied via a tactic that was not available for other companies 
– via their parent company HeidelbergCement Group. This tactic is not related to their size, 
but to the size and cross-border production of HeidelbergCement. It has subsidiaries in other 
countries, which in turn provides the subsidiaries with possibilities to lobby via their parent 
company. 
However, the company size and cross-border production come short when trying to explain 
why Norske Skog used the least lobbying routes among the companies studied here. Norske 
Skog has also production in other countries, but lobbying via these has not been relevant, 
because the production is small compared to other paper companies in these countries 
(interviews 2010), which suggests that for a foreign company it is easier to lobby via national 
associations in other countries, if the production there is large. However, Norske Skog‘s 
precise motivation not to lobby via national associations in other countries remains unclear.  
Norske Skog is a Norwegian company and it is not large enough to lobby alone and thus 
lobbying via CEPI provided better possibilities for lobbying at the EU level (interview 2010). 
That points to the factor of originating from a non-EU country Norway. Norske Skog could 
not lobby via the Federation of Norwegian Industries who was only a listening post. There 
was lack of access to the EU level also via national institutions as discussed in section 6.1.1. 
Therefore, the lack of lobbying routes for Norske Skog was probably due to Norway not 
being a member of the EU.  
It is also possible that there were some kind of sectoral influences on companies‘ direct 
lobbying during the revision of the EU ETS as metal producers were followed by cement 
companies according to the number of lobbying routes used. Although this explanation does 
not explain why SCA used so many lobbying routes and Norske Skog so few. The EU ETS 
might be in fact of different importance for the companies studied in this thesis. For example, 
the representative for Norsk Hydro stated that the issue of the EU ETS is so important that 
they have to act and use all relevant possibilities (interview 2010). It also fits with the 
observation that their main effort in lobbying was at the EU level, as the design of the EU 
ETS can be assumed to be more important than linking Norway to the scheme. Also the 
representative for SSAB stated that it is important to try to participate in the policy-making at 
all levels and that the EU ETS has all the time been a very crucial issue. He also expressed 
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surprise that so many of the energy intensive industry sectors are defined as prone to carbon 
leakage together with steel (interview 2010). The representative for Norske Skog noted that 
they so far they have been influenced by the EU ETS just to a small degree. However, they 
also considered it an important issue from the period of 2013 (interview 2010). The 
representative for SCA explained that they and the rest of the European paper industry did not 
perceive the issue of EU ETS so pressing back in 2007 and 2008 due to low CO2 allowance 
prices. Looking back, they admittedly don‘t consider this a wise decision anymore (interviews 
2010). 
The emissions from the sectors studied are likely to vary considerably. The comparison is 
challenging due to an absence of reliable or comparable data by individual sector. Here I use 
data from Sandbag (2010a), although it excludes aluminum production and combines cement 
and lime as well as steel and iron production. In 2009 the emissions in Europe from steel and 
iron production were over 94 million tons, from cement and lime over 151 million tons, and 
the emissions from paper production were close to just 28 million tons (Sandbag 2010a)
34
. 
Sandbag has also a report on companies that were holding far too generous allowances from 
the emission trading (Sandbag 2010b). Among the top ten companies measured by surplus of 
allowances in 2008 and 2009, there are five steel and three cement companies. Therefore it is 
reasonable to claim that the EU ETS has affected cement and steel sector in general more than 
paper production in terms of emission quantities and the amount of surplus allowances
35
.  
Norske Skog‘s low number of used lobbying routes might thus be due to the fact that they did 
not see the issue as pressing as the other companies. However, same could be said about SCA 
and they used thirteen lobbying routes, compared to Norske Skog‘s five, even though SCA 
admitted focusing too little on the revision of the EU ETS. Thus, although it is plausible that 
the firms lobbying was influenced by sectoral differences in how much the companies were 
affected by the EU ETS, it is far from clear if it really was so. 
                                                 
34
 I suspect there is better data available but I was unable to find any. The European Environment Agency also 
combines different sectors in some of their publications. And when the sectors and emissions are aggregated in 
their annual greenhouse gas inventory reports, it is too technically detailed for reasonable comparison 
purposes according to my knowledge.  
35
 Emissions on individual companies were not chosen, because it is reasonable that bigger companies have 
more emissions and how to define the emissions that are due to larger size so that the emissions would be 
comparable between the companies was unclear.  
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Hypothesis 2.1 Larger firms engaged in more direct lobbying at the EU level than smaller 
firms. 
This hypothesis is based on Bennet‘s (1999) and Bernhagen and Mitchell‘s (2009) findings 
that larger firms undertake more direct lobbying at the European level and both explain it with 
better resources that large companies have. Coen (2007: 339) notes that large firms can 
acquire insider status in the Commission due to their size and cross-border production, which 
implies that larger firms might be more capable of direct lobbying. To analyze if the findings 
support this hypothesis, it is useful to divide the companies into three categories according to 
their size (small, medium and large) measured in revenue and verify which firms used direct 
lobby at the EU level. Small companies are Norcem (1.4 billion NOK) and Cementa (1.56 
billion NOK); medium are Norske Skog (27 billion NOK) and SSAB (42 billion NOK); large 
companies are Norsk Hydro (94 billion NOK) and SCA (92 billion NOK). Of course, such a 
comparison is only feasible among the firms studied here since in general a firm, which 
revenue is measured in hundreds of millions, hardly can be labeled as small. 
 
Table 6.2. Company size and direct lobbying 
 Firm used direct lobbying at the EU level 
Company size Yes No 
Small Cementa Norcem 
Medium SSAB Norske Skog 
Big Norsk Hydro SCA 
The results in the table 6.2. do not support the hypothesis that larger firms lobby more alone at 
the EU level than smaller ones. In all of the three size divisions there was one company that 
had lobbied alone and one that had not. Therefore at least based on the data gathered in this 
thesis, one can say that the size of the company might not be such a strong influence on firms‘ 
lobbying directly. This contrasts with what one could expect from Bennett (1999) and 
Bernhagen and Mitchells (2009) results – both studies find a strong positive effect of 
company size on direct lobbying. It is plausible that belonging to the EU member state has a 
stronger effect than size, as discussed above, on firms‘ decisions to lobby directly. 
It is also noteworthy that both metal producers, Norsk Hydro and SSAB, lobbied directly at 
the European level and the paper producers, Norske Skog and SCA, did not. Thus, the 
previously highlighted possibility of companies being affected by the EU ETS to a different 
degree can also influence if the firms chose to lobby directly or not. 
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6.3 Other explanations 
In the theory chapter other possible influences on firms‘ lobbying routes were identified, in 
addition to those that were incorporated in the hypotheses. First, conflict in the EU 
associations and secondly, the policy-phase that can influence which institutions the firms 
might choose to target when lobbying. When I above discussed the use of EU associations, it 
was noted that all the companies had used the EU associations extensively in spite of the 
differences in the number of members and that none of the companies reported any conflict in 
these associations during the revision of the EU ETS. Rather, the interviewees saw some 
differences of opinions as a normal part of the process on the way to finding useful 
compromises (interviews 2010).  
To make sure that the policy phase did not affect which institutions were lobbied, this issue 
was taken into account during the interviewing process. The policy-initiation phase was 
understood as taking place from the Commission‘s report on the EU ETS in November 2006 
until the proposal for the revised directive in January 2008. The policy-development phase 
was operationalized taking place from January 2008 from the proposal for the revised 
directive to the final adopted Directive 2009/29 in December 2008. The results were 
somewhat unexpected. Namely, it is not possible to identify if the policy-phase had an impact 
or not for several reasons.  
Firstly, for the interviewees it was generally impossible to differentiate between the policy 
phases. They could not remember which institutions were lobbied at a certain point as it took 
place several years ago (interviews 2010). Peoples‘ memories are limited and influenced by 
psychological processes as for example rationalizing and especially so in complex situations 
(Andersen 2006: 292-294), which the revising of the EU ETS definitely is. However, it would 
be one-sided to explain the absence of results only by interviewees‘ lack of memory. During 
the interviews it became also clear that even though one can label policy phases in political 
science, in practice the interviewees could not differentiate between the policy phases because 
the EU ETS review was perceived as one constant process (interviews 2010). In addition to 
this, the revision of the EU ETS did not follow the usual co-decision procedure and the three 
institutions were engaged more with each other in the policy-development phase. This was 
because the French presidency had requested a trialogue process. That meant that the proposal 
for the directive was discussed in the three institutions in parallel (Skjærseth & Wettestad 
2010: 116) rather than in sequence. It is probable that in such a peculiar policy-making 
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procedure, the three institutions were more or less equal as lobbying targets especially in the 
policy development phase.  
Furthermore, the research uncovered some possible influences on firms‘ lobbying routes that 
had been not considered before data collection. Some of these, such as cross-border 
production, being a subsidiary to another company, sectoral differences in the EU ETS‘ 
impact, were mentioned already. The interviews exposed also two other possible influences 
that are shortly outlined below. 
Two of the interviewees claimed that that the size of a sector both in terms of revenue and 
people employed also influences how easily a company can lobby alone. This is because the 
EU policy-makers prefer to include and hear opinions from those who can represent interests 
on a wider scale (interviews 2010). Related to sector‘s size is Bennett‘s (1999) finding that 
although the company size was the most important factor on firm‘s conducting direct 
lobbying, the sector‘s structure also had an influence. He found that companies from sectors 
that consist of a small number of large companies use more direct lobbying. Therefore the 
sectoral differences might also originate from the sector‘s characteristics. 
Secondly, it is possible that there are some differences in company culture. The company 
representative for SCA noted that in 2009 and 2010 there has been much more focus on 
lobbying at the EU level. But it has been undertaken via CEPI, not alone. In fact, he couldn‘t 
recall a single occurrence of when SCA had been at meetings with the EU policy-makers 
alone or sent letters or position papers alone (interview 2010). Similarly the representative for 
Cementa explained that lobbying late in the EU policy-making and trying to influence the 
MEP‘s voting is not a preferred lobbying strategy for Swedish firms (interview 2010). This on 
the other hand suggests that some companies do not see lobbying alone as a suitable tactic. 
The internal culture of firms might influence how much they undertake direct lobbying. When 
one of the tactics is excluded due to company culture, automatically several possible lobbying 
routes are excluded as well, because each tactic can (at least theoretically) be used for 
lobbying at different institutions. 
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7 Conclusion 
7.1 Summing up the study 
The purpose of this thesis was to study how selected firms from energy intensive industries in 
Sweden and Norway lobbied in the revision process of the EU ETS.  
In the background chapter it was shown that firms from the energy intensive industries had 
participated in the policy-making of the EU ETS from the beginning, while there is only 
sporadic evidence of how these firms lobbied, at which institutions and what influenced their 
lobbying choices. Neither was there information on whether the firms from non-EU countries 
lobbied differently than firms from EU countries. Literature about possible influences on how 
and where firms lobby is often both scant and conflicting. Especially so when it comes to 
analyzing firms‘ from non-EU countries. Therefore the following research questions were 
established: 
1. How did selected Swedish and Norwegian companies seek to influence the EU ETS 
revision process? Did they lobby similarly or differently? 
2. Which factors can best explain similarities and differences in the choice of lobbying 
routes? 
To answer the research questions I developed a system of lobbying routes as presented in the 
theory chapter. The approach was chosen to include various lobbying tactics firms can choose 
as well as the different EU institutions the lobbying firms can target. Analyses that would 
compare both which institutions firms targeted and how these were accessed is not common 
in the literature. Although there are exceptions, e.g. Tenbücken (2002).  Several theoretical 
and empirical studies were used as analytical building blocks to design a system of lobbying 
routes and finding possible influences on which of these routes firms used. Four hypotheses 
were developed and used to guide the analysis: 
Hypothesis 1: Swedish and Norwegian firms differed in lobbying routes due to originating 
from a EU member state or non-member state. 
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Hypothesis 1.1: Norwegian firms used more direct lobbying at the EU level than their 
Swedish counterparts due to their outsider status in the European associations and the 
lack of a ―member state patron‖ in the EU institutions. 
Hypothesis 2: Larger firms used more different routes than smaller firms. 
Hypothesis 2.1: Larger firms engaged in more direct lobbying at the EU level than 
smaller firms. 
With this study I also attempted to contribute to the research on lobbying by comparing the 
Swedish and Norwegian firms‘ use of lobbying routes and whether differences can be 
explained by EU membership, or the lack thereof. The study was limited to three companies 
in Norway and three in Sweden that represented aluminum, steel, cement and paper 
production.  
The firms‘ lobbying profiles, created by means of key-informant interviews with company 
representatives, were analyzed comparatively by looking both at which tactics and targets the 
companies used and what could explain their choices. There were both similarities and 
differences among the companies in relation to their lobbying routes. The limited collected 
evidence did not allow establishing any far-reaching conclusions; however, there were several 
findings that will be discussed conclusively below. 
7.2 Reasons for similarities between the companies 
The most striking similarity among the companies was the extensive use of both EU and 
national associations. All the companies used their EU associations and national associations 
as a lobbying tactic. The EU associations were used to lobby at all the EU institutions. When 
firms lobbied via their national associations they did not use large national umbrella 
associations, such as the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise or the Confederation of 
Swedish Enterprise. They relied only on industry associations as the Federation of Norwegian 
Industries in Norway, or even narrower industry organizations in Sweden.  
The prevalence of collective lobbying is also reflected in the finding that three out of six 
companies level used lobbying alone at the EU and only Norsk Hydro relied on it extensively. 
The other two companies (SSAB and Cementa) saw lobbying alone at the EU level more as a 
complementary tactic. There was more lobbying at the national level, but even then it was not 
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seen as more important than lobbying via national associations. Lobbying in alliance was used 
only by one Norwegian company in Norway and it was seen as an additional option to 
lobbying via the Federation of Norwegian Industries. Lobbying in alliance is thus not a tactic 
that is popular among the firms studied; the firms prefer to rather lobby via different 
associations.  
The main conclusion that can be drawn here is that companies prefer to be represented 
―together with the same interests‖. It seems that collective representation is preferred both by 
the EU and national institutions as during interviews the company representatives emphasized 
repeatedly that alone they would not be heard (interviews 2010). Such collective lobbying is 
probably as common because the associations also take a significant workload from the 
companies. While the EU associations were targeted at the EU institutions the national 
associations were used most for lobbying at the national institutions. Thus these associations 
can be seen as primary tactics either at the EU or national level. However, one should 
differentiate between broad and narrow national associations, as the former were not relevant 
for the studied firms‘ lobbying during the revision of the EU ETS. The reasoning was that 
these represent too wide and also conflicting interests (interviews 2010). Interestingly enough, 
the Federation of Norwegian Industries includes also power producers but the Norwegian 
representatives did not mention any conflict in the organization, nor were there any 
considerable differences of opinions in the EU associations found (interviews 2010). Either 
there were no conflicts, or the representatives did not want to disclose them. In the latter case 
the importance of the associations is even strengthened as then these were used as lobbying 
tactics in spite of conflicts. Contrary to Mazey and Richardson‘s claim about the sluggishness 
of the EU associations (2006: 255), these were in fact used and valued as a lobbing tactic. 
7.3 Reasons for differences between the companies  
There were differences between firms‘ lobbying routes, both when it comes to the use of 
tactics and at which institutions companies lobbied. Without a doubt the main finding of this 
study is that the Norwegian firms differed from their Swedish counterparts based on lobbying 
tactics used and by which institutions they lobbied at. Therefore the first hypothesis was 
supported in this study. To my knowledge there is no literature that would study how the 
differences in lobbying tactics influences the targets that were lobbied while taking account of 
possible differences between firms. Thus these findings are interesting even though it is not 
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easy to compare or generalize based on other studies. So which specific differences can be 
detected and what explains these? 
Firstly, Norwegian companies hardly used their national institutions to access the EU 
institutions while Swedish firms used Swedish national institutions to lobby at the EU level 
and especially at the Council. This probably weakened Norwegian firms‘ possibilities for 
lobbying at the EU institutions. The most probable reasons found that could explain these 
differences were primarily the Norwegian authorities‘ lack of access, but also their missing 
motivation or capabilities to participate in the policy discussions in the EU. It was almost 
certainly also influenced by the fact that the ―Norwegian political arena‖ was occupied with 
the debate of how to link Norway to the EU ETS. Thus it is likely that such differences would 
have been either inexistent or smaller in case Norway right from the start had decided to 
follow the EU ETS as it was to be designed.  
Secondly, the national associations were not used for lobbying at the EU level by the 
Norwegian companies either, while two of the Swedish companies did. Therefore it can be 
concluded that Norwegian companies had less access to EU institutions. The access to the 
European Parliament and the Council in particular was more difficult, as Swedish companies 
were able to use national associations to lobby at these institutions. This difference seems to 
come from the Federation of Norwegian Industries‘ lack of access to the EU level as it has ―a 
listening role‖ to bring information to Norway only, not to influence the policy-making.  
Thirdly, Norwegian companies lobbied also less alone at the EU level, although the difference 
was not large. The representatives for Norske Skog and Norcem expressed that they were not 
able to lobby alone at the EU level. The only firm who engaged in direct lobbying at the EU 
level was Norsk Hydro. However, since Norsk Hydro has also production in other countries, it 
probably is perceived ―more European‖ than the other two and that was likely to raise the 
possibilities for direct lobbying at the EU level. All in all, Norwegian companies had less 
access to the EU institutions due to less direct lobbying. It also shows that the Norwegian 
companies studied here encountered problems in lobbying directly at the EU level, as 
anticipated based on Hamada (2007). Bernhagen and Mitchell (2009) suggested that non-EU 
firms would develop their own lobbying capabilities due to a lack of a ―member state patron‖ 
in the EU institutions. It is in these assumptions the Hypothesis 1.1 was grounded. However, 
the hypothesis was not supported here since Norwegian firms in fact lobbied less alone at the 
EU level. Hypothesis 2.1 on the other hand raised the possibility that larger firms lobby more 
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directly than smaller. This expectation was not confirmed either and thus Bennett‘s (1999) 
and Bernhagen and Mitchell‘s (2009) findings did not gain support here. Lobbying alone was 
used more by the Swedish companies, and possibly direct lobbying can be also explained by 
sectoral differences in the level of impact by the EU ETS. This possible explanation originates 
from the finding that metal producers used direct lobbying, paper producers did not, and that 
one cement company did and the other did not. 
Some other differences between the companies cannot be explained by originating from a EU 
country. The size seems to have an effect on the amount of lobbying routes the companies 
used, although it was not directly linked to revenue. The number of lobbying routes seems to 
be affected by several things. One was the cross-border production of companies – both Norsk 
Hydro and SCA, who used the most lobbying routes (13), lobbied via national associations 
and institutions in other countries. Cross-border production and revenue is related, because in 
general more production also creates more revenue. Coen and Dannreuther‘s (2003) claim 
that larger firms have been more able to lobby at the EU level is therefore supported here. 
However, the number of used lobbying routes was also influenced by other things. Lobbying 
in other countries was not available to all the companies. Neither was lobbying via a parent 
company. This tactic was used by the two cement companies. Consequently it is not just the 
cross-border production or size of a company per se that influenced how many and which 
lobbying routes a firm used, but also the cross-border size of the parent company.  
However the number of lobbying routes is possibly also influenced by how much the different 
sectors are influenced by the EU ETS, since the aluminum and steel producers were followed 
by cement producers according to the number of lobbying routes used. At the same time, it 
does not explain why one paper company used the least lobbying routes and another one most 
lobbying routes. The firm with least lobbying routes was Norske Skog and it can be seen as a 
Norwegian company that experienced all the difficulties in lobbying outlined above without 
the possibility of compensating these by lobbying via national associations or institutions in 
other countries or via a parent company. Nevertheless, it is not viable to state if any of these 
possibilities were more important than others. In addition, I found indications that policy-
phase, company culture and general sectoral characteristics might have had an influence on 
companies‘ lobbying routes. It was, however, not possible study these in depth here.  
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7.4 Some proposals for research and practical use 
One should be careful to generalize based on a few selected cases, but some suggestions are 
possible to indicate. Since the Norwegian firms studied experienced difficulties in lobbying 
compared to their Swedish counterparts, I will first focus on how possibilities for lobbying the 
EU institutions could be enhanced for Norwegian firms (and perhaps also for other interest 
groups if they experience similar problems with lobbying). Additionally I raise some 
suggestions for further research based on the lessons to draw here.  
Based on the findings and analysis, it can be concluded that Norwegian firms should use the 
main available tactic to a maximum degree – the EU associations. Norsk Hydro seems to have 
done precisely this when it reorganized its internal procedures for participation at the different 
associations of which it is a member, in order to have the participants from Norsk Hydro be 
well-prepared and knowledgeable at all the meetings. Such an active stance can have 
strengthened Norsk Hydro‘s position also inside the EU associations and contributed to its 
ability to lobby alone. Secondly, although the Norwegian authorities have less access to the 
EU institutions, the opportunities to represent Norwegian firms (and other interests) could be 
increased. EU issues can be emphasized more in the national institutions and instead of taking 
a position of passive outsiders, an active stance to represent Norwegian interests inside the EU 
whenever possible should be taken. This is of course only achievable if the Norwegian state 
defines its policy goals more in line with the firms (or other interests it attempts to represent), 
as it clearly was not the case during the process of linking Norway to the EU ETS. 
To come to the EU ETS, some suggestions can be made for further studies on the matter. 
Despite our knowledge that both industry and other actors have been part of the designing and 
revision of the EU ETS, further studies on how and where these lobbied are clearly needed to 
understand the policy-making processes better. It is both of interest to understand which 
interests have managed to influence the EU ETS, but also how they have proceeded. Such 
understanding would allow also evaluating if and how exactly certain interests are excluded 
from the policy-making. The companies in this study represent energy intensive industry 
firms that are included in the EU ETS in Sweden and Norway. It is plausible to claim that the 
identified similarities and differences can be relevant for other energy intensive industry firms 
in Norway and Sweden included in the EU ETS. In addition, Norway is a country that is 
closely tied to the EU since it is a member of the European Economic Area (EEA) and it 
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would be interesting to study whether similar patterns can be found among for example 
Iceland‘s energy intensive industries.  
How much these conclusions apply to other policy areas, countries and interest types is of 
course unsure. There is very little comparative research on firms‘ lobbying and to the effects 
of originating from a EU or non-EU state. This study points to several possibilities for further 
research. Similarities and differences among firms that might be explained by originating 
from a EU member state could be studied on a wider level including companies from several 
countries, in another policy area than the EU ETS and taking account of other interests than 
just energy intensive industries. If focusing on firms, such attempts should consider taking 
into account size, cross-border production, being a subsidiary, sectoral differences in how 
affected a company is by a policy and possibly also sectoral characteristics and company 
culture. Secondly, if the influence of a policy-phase on lobbying routes is to be studied, the 
research should follow a policy process in real time and identify co-decision. Thirdly, 
narrower and wider national associations should be differentiated when studying lobbying, 
because the use of these seems to differ. 
The general insight that might be drawn from this study is that firms‘ from non-EU countries 
probably experience difficulties in lobbying at the EU. And maybe even more than 
Norwegian companies, since Norway has a close relationship to the EU due to participating in 
the EEA. How common such difficulties are among non-EU firms and if there are similarities 
with the conclusions drawn here, is without a doubt an interesting study topic. Not only 
within political science, but also for policy-makers both at the EU and the national level. If 
the first do not want to listen and the other do not want to represent, and the interests do not 
know how to be heard, a policy-making process can doubtfully be characterized as democratic 
and legitimate.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A List of interviewees and interview guides 
Table A1. List of interviewees 
Name  Title Company 
Per Brevik Director Alternative Fuels Norcem 
Lasse Nord Senior Vice President 
Corporate Strategy, Climate office 
Norsk Hydro 
Georg Carlberg Vice President Environment Norske Skog 
Per-Erik Eriksson Vice President Energy SCA 
Kim Kärsrud Director of Environmental Affairs SSAB 
Anders Lyberg Technical Director Cementa 
Svein Sundsbø Director Industrial Policy The Federation of Norwegian Industies 
 
The base for the interview guide 
Background questions 
1. How does the EU ETS affect Company X, and what are the biggest issues?  
2. Does Company X feel that there was a clear need to change the EU ETS from 2013? 
   (probe) Why and how? 
3. How much and how have you been involved in the policy-making process for the EU ETS 
rules for the period starting from 2013?  
4. How many people in Company X have been working with representing the company‘s‘ 
interests to decision makers either in Sweden/Norway or in the European Union? 
 
Questions about the interest representation patterns 
5. Could you explain if and how Company X participated in the policy-making during the 
revision of the EU ETS in 2007 and 2008? 
6. More specifically I am interested if Company X  took any specific actions in representing 
its positions in any of the following ways: 
a. Exclusively alone 
b. In alliance with other companies or organizations 
c. Via a national association 
d. Via an European association 
 (ask) Where there any other national or European associations that were relevant for the 
interest representation for Company X on this matter? 
7. Were any of the abovementioned choices preferred/disfavored over others?  
 (probe) If so, then why?  
  (ask) Why was each choice used or not used? 
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8. Was Company X‟s interest representation aimed  
a. At the national institutions  
and/or at any of the following European institutions : 
a. The European Parliament 
b. The Commission 
c.  The Council 
9. If yes, what influenced the choice and were any of the mentioned venues preferred over the 
others? 
  Why was each choice used or not used? 
10. Were the options under the question 6 used for interest representation at any of the 
specific venues mentioned in the question 8? Could you explain the choices? 
(For example, if participating in the policy-making exclusively alone was done more at the 
Council, while participating in alliance was prevalent at the national level, then what were 
the reasons for that?) 
 Why  were these options used and others not used 
11. Were there any differences in how the interest representation was conducted during the 
policy preparation in 2007 compared to the policy-making processes in 2008?  
  (probe) How? Why? 
About the company level issues 
12. Were there any companies or organizations (both in Sweden and in the European Union) 
that were also active in the policy making but had different opinions on the matter? Did it in 
any way affect Company X‘s participation in the policy-making process?  
13. Were there any companies or organizations (both in Sweden and in the European Union) 
that were also active in the policy making but had similar interests as Company X on the 
matter? Did it in any way affect Company X‟s participation in the policy-making process?  
14. Would you describe Company X as more or less active as other companies and 
organizations in the policy-making of EU ETS in 2007 and 2008?  
 (probe) Why so? How good were the possibilities for following the policy-making 
processes? 
 
Questions about the national level: 
15.  Company X is a member in National association – how active has Company X been in 
National association, especially in relation to the development of the EU ETS rules for the 
period from 2013? Could you describe the cooperation? 
  Where there disagreements on the matter in the national association?  
16.  How good were the possibilities for National association to participate in designing the 
rules for the EU ETS in 2007 and 2008? 
17.  Are you satisfied with National association‘s work on this matter? 
 
Questions about the European associations 
18.  Company X is a member in EU Association via National association/or directly, how did 
the cooperation between EU Association and Company X take place on this matter (if there 
was any)? 
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 Where there disagreements on the matter in the European association?  
19.  Is there also direct contact between EU Association and Company X? 
20.  Do you think EU Association had good possibilities in representing Company X interests 
in the EU ETS review in 2007 and 2008? 
21.  Are you satisfied with EU Association‘s work on this matter? 
 
Questions about Norwegian and Swedish companies: 
22. Do you think there are any differences in how well Swedish/Norwegian companies can 
participate in and influence the EU policy-making processes compared to Company X and 
could you explain these? 
 
The base overview of the study and interview questions the companies recieved 
The thesis is about interest representation strategies of energy intensive companies in EU 
emissions trading policy, focusing upon the preparation and decision-making processes in 
2007 and 2008 when revised rules for the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) post-2012 
were decided upon. Among other things, the importance for companies of belonging to nation 
states within or outside of the EU, as well as possible sectoral differences, is discussed. The 
thesis compares several Norwegian and Swedish companies in three sectors considered to be 
strongly influenced by emission trading, namely cement; pulp and paper, and metal 
production. 
Below are the main questions I would like to cover during the interview.  
1. How does the EU ETS affect Company X, and what are the biggest issues?  
2. Does Company X feel that there was a clear need to change the EU ETS from 2013? 
3. Could you explain if and how Company X participated in the policy-making during the 
revision of the EU ETS in 2007 and 2008? 
4. More specifically I am interested if Company X  took any specific actions in representing 
its positions in any of the following ways: 
a. Exclusively alone 
b. In alliance with other companies or organizations 
c. Via a national association 
d. Via an European association 
5. Was Company X‟s interest representation aimed  
a. At the national institutions  
and/or at any of the following European institutions : 
b. The European Parliament 
c. The Commission 
d.  The Council 
6. Were the options under the question 4 used for interest representation at any of the specific 
venues mentioned in the question 5? Could you explain the choices? 
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 (For example, if participating in the policy-making exclusively alone was done more at the 
Council, while participating in alliance was prevalent at the national level, then what were 
the reasons for that?) 
7. Were there any differences in how the interest representation was conducted during the 
policy preparation in 2007 compared to the policy-making processes in 2008? 
8. Were there any companies or organizations (both in Sweden and in the European Union) 
that were also active in the policy making but had different/and or the same opinions on the 
matter? Did it in any way affect Company X‘s participation in the policy-making process?  
9. Company X is a member in National association – how active has Company X been in 
National association, especially in relation to the development of the EU ETS rules for the 
period from 2013? Could you describe the cooperation? 
10. Company X is a member in EU Association via National association/or directly, how did 
the cooperation between EU Association and Company X take place on this matter (if there 
was any)? 
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Appendix B Use of the tactics at each of the targets by the companies  
 The targets 
The tactics The European 
Parliament 
The European 
Commission 
The 
EuropeanCouncil 
Alone Norsk Hydro 
Cementa 
SSAB 
Norsk Hydro SSAB 
EU association Norsk Hydro 
Norcem 
Cementa 
SCA 
SSAB 
Norske Skog 
Norsk Hydro 
Norcem 
Cementa 
SCA 
SSAB 
Norske Skog 
Norsk Hydro 
Norcem 
Cementa 
SCA 
Norske Skog 
 
National 
association 
SCA (twice) 
SSAB 
 SSAB 
Parent company Norcem Norcem 
Cementa 
Norcem 
National 
institutions 
Norsk Hydro 
Cementa 
SSAB 
SCA (twice) 
Norsk Hydro (twice) 
SSAB 
SCA (twice) 
Norsk Hydro 
SSAB 
Cementa 
SCA (twice) 
 
